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Road tunnels are important transport infrastructures, providing underground 
vehicular passageways for commuters and motorists, especially useful in densely 
populated cities such as Singapore. However, the safe operation of road tunnels is of 
the utmost concern, due to the heavy traffic that urban road tunnels carry. Accidents 
occurring in a road tunnel may lead to catastrophic consequences in terms of deaths, 
due to the enclosed nature of the tunnel structure. Accordingly, quantitative risk 
analysis (including risk assessment and control/management) has become an explicit 
requirement under the European Union Directive (2004/54/EC) and the Project Safety 
Review Manual in Singapore.   
The tunnel characteristics (e.g. geometries, safety provisions, and traffic flow) 
for some urban road tunnels may vary from one section to another. These urban road 
tunnels with non-uniform tunnel parameters are referred to as non-homogeneous 
urban road tunnels in this study.  
In this dissertation, we propose a risk assessment model (QRAM-I), whereby a 
non-homogeneous urban road tunnel can be segmented into a number of 
homogeneous sections. For each tunnel section, the frequency of fire is estimated 
using a fault tree technique incorporating a proposed Time to Collision (TTC)-based 
crash frequency estimation model (as detailed in Chapter 3); a fire simulation model 
and fractional effective dose (FED) methodology are applied to estimate the number 
of fatalities under different accident scenarios, by taking into account the different 
working statuses of tunnel safety provisions. Having obtained the frequency and 
consequences for various accident scenarios for all tunnel sections, an aggregated 
QRA model is built by combining the section-based QRA models (as detailed in 




operators’ evaluation of risks in urban road tunnels (as detailed in Appendix C). The 
software has been applied by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore to assess the 
risks of urban road tunnels in the country.  
In the QRAM-I model, a number of input parameters possess epistemic or 
aleatory uncertainty. Apparently, crisp values are not appropriate for representing 
these uncertain parameters. Therefore, we carry out a further study (QRAM-II) by 
taking into account the parameter uncertainty in the QRA modelling framework (as 
detailed in Chapter 6): aleatory uncertainty is formulated by probability distribution 
functions, and parameters with epistemic uncertainty are represented by fuzzy 
numbers. A hybrid Monte Carlo simulation-based approach is proposed to propagate 
the parameter uncertainty, by taking into account the dependencies among these 
uncertain parameters. Finally, percentile-based individual risk and  -cut based 
societal risk are proposed, to provide more information to tunnel operators with 
distinct risk attitudes.  
Two studies concerning risk control/management are also conducted on the 
basis of the two risk assessment models. Based on the QRAM-I, a risk impact analysis 
methodology is proposed to examine the effects of traffic flows on risk control/ 
management (as detailed in Chapter 5). An excess risk index is defined to quantify the 
severities of unacceptable scenarios which place road tunnel operations above a 
predetermined safety target. A contour chart, based on the excess risk index, could be 
used to help tunnel operators implement suitable risk control/management solutions. 
Based on the QRAM-II, an optimization model is proposed to select optimal 
combinations of tunnel safety provisions (as detailed in Chapter 7). The objective 
function is aimed at minimizing the life cycle costs of tunnel safety provisions, 




taking advantage of the special structure of the optimization model, a Bi-Section 
Search and Bound Algorithm (BSSBA) is designed to efficiently solve the problem.  
In this thesis, two risk assessment models (QRAM-I and QRAM-II) are 
developed to assess the risks of non-homogeneous urban road tunnels. On the basis of 
the two risk assessment models, two risk control/management strategies are proposed 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Urban Road Tunnels 
Road tunnels are critical transportation infrastructures, which provide 
underground vehicular passageways for motorists and commuters. This is especially 
important in cities where there are limitations on the land allocated to road 
transportation (PIARC, 2008; Meng et al., 2009). Some of their advantages include 
increasing traffic capacity, improving accessibility, and thus reducing travelling time. 
In addition, the negative impacts of traffic on the environment, such as air and noise 
pollution, which are becoming a major concern for the general public and the 
authorities, can be efficiently reduced by containing traffic in road tunnels 
underground. With the growing traffic volume and urban development, as well as 
increasing demands on land use, especially in urban areas, constructing road tunnels is 
becoming more and more popular. For example, in Singapore, the Central 
Expressway (CTE) and Kallang Paya Lebar Expressway (KPE) road tunnels have 
been open since September 21st, 1991 and September 20th, 2008, respectively, while 
the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) and Central Expressway II (CTE II) are under 
construction and due to open in 2012.  
The urban road tunnels in Singapore are different from those in other countries, 
from the viewpoints of the following two aspects. Firstly, Singapore is a city nation, 
with scarce land and a high population density, which results in heavy traffic in road 
tunnels, especially during peak hours. A road tunnel in Singapore has many 
conjunctions, at which the main tunnel merges with slip roads, and the distance 
between consecutive conjunctions is comparatively short. For example, the KPE road 
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tunnel has 19 slip roads along a nine-kilometre main tunnel bore. Road tunnels in 
Singapore may be linked together with major roads and/or expressways and hence, 
unlike most tunnels that only have one entry and one exit, possess multiple entries and 
exits. Accordingly, the traffic flow and tunnel geometries possess obvious non-
homogeneity, that is the tunnel parameters and traffic flows are different from one 
section to another. Secondly, several slip roads may be attached to a main tunnel 
section and these can also be regarded as tunnel-like road sections. Thus, the whole 
tunnel may be branched into several sections, with distinct geometric and traffic 
characteristics. Such road tunnels, characterized by non-uniform tunnel parameters - 
for example tunnel configurations, geometries, tunnel safety provisions (e.g. tunnel 
ventilation system, fire detection system, etc.), traffic volumes and accident 
frequencies, among others - are referred to as non-homogeneous urban road tunnels in 
this dissertation.  
Their safe operation is of utmost concern, due to the heavy traffic volume that 
the road tunnels carry. Accidents occurring in a road tunnel may lead to severe 
consequences, due to the enclosed nature of the tunnel structure. For example, in 1999, 
39 people lost their lives in a fire disaster in the Mont Blanc Tunnel between France 
and Italy, and another disaster in the Tauern Tunnel in Austria resulted in 12 fatalities 
(Leitner, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2002). These accidents have raised awareness 
among the public and the government of the safety aspects of the tunnels and their 
consequences for the users. Thus, quantitative risk analysis for road tunnels has been 
one of the requirements under the European Union (EU) Directive (2004/54/EC) and 
the Netherlands’ legislation on road tunnels. In Singapore, a safety target is required 
to be met by all major road tunnels longer than 240 metres, in accordance with the 
Project Safety Review (PSR) procedure manual for roads in the country (LTA, 2005).  




1.2 Fires in Urban Road Tunnels  
The French (Perard, 1996), German (Elbtunnel, 2006), Swiss (Ruckstuhl, 1990), 
Italian (Arditi, 2003), and Singaporean (HCD, 2009) accident statistics analysis shows 
that the frequency of accidents in road tunnels is lower than that on the open road1. 
Yet, there is no doubt that the consequences of a fire in a road tunnel are likely to be 
far more serious than those of a fire on an open road. In reality, once a fire has started, 
the concentration of oxygen (O2) will decrease dramatically because tunnels are 
enclosed spaces; at the same time, the concentration of toxic gases, such as carbon 
monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2), will increase. CO is one of the major 
narcotic gases in fires and is believed to be one of the prime causes of incapacitation 
and death. CO reacts with haemoglobin in the blood to form carboxyhemoglobin 
(COHb), which reduces the blood’s ability to supply critical organs with oxygen. 
According to the Fire Protection Handbook (National Fire Protection Association, 
2008), CO2 is quite low in terms of its own toxicological potency and is not, by itself, 
normally considered a toxicant in fire atmospheres. However, it does stimulate both 
the rate and depth of breathing, thereby increasing the fatality rate caused by CO. 
Lack of oxygen is another contributing cause to incapacitation and death. Indeed, it 
has been well recognized and reported that toxic gases are responsible for most fire 
fatalities (Babrauskas et al., 1998; Besserre and Delort, 1997), and fire is inarguably 
considered the most disastrous hazard in urban road tunnels (PIARC, 1999; PIARC, 
2008). The 51 fatalities in the Mont Blanc and Tauern tunnels in 1999 were all the 
result of toxic gases generated by vehicle fires.   
                                                 
1 Possible reasons for this include the following: motorists in road tunnels are more cautious; road 
tunnels are not affected by complications caused by the weather; the gradients of road tunnels are 
usually gentle.  
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In view of the high consequences of fires in road tunnels, various types of tunnel 
safety provisions have to be implemented, as required by land transport authorities. 
These tunnel safety provisions can be categorized into fire detection systems, fire 
verification systems, tunnel ventilation systems (also referred to as ventilation and 
smoke extraction systems), and fire fighting systems.  
Fire detection systems are vital for tunnel safety, since other systems (e.g. tunnel 
verification systems, tunnel ventilation systems, etc.) used in road tunnels depend on 
detection systems for their operation. There are many types of fire detection devices 
which can be implemented in road tunnels. For example, automatic incident detectors 
(AID) work on the basis of traffic videos, while linear heat detectors (LHD) are 
activated when the temperature becomes higher than a given threshold. Fire detection 
systems should meet the following requirements:  
(1) 30-60 second detection times;  
(2) Guaranteed operation in case of cable breakage, through failsafe functions;  
(3) Monitored integration into a fire alarm system;  
(4) A maximum repair time of 30 minutes for mechanically damaged cables.  
Details of fire detection systems can be found in Chapter 5 of the Handbook of 
Tunnel Fire Safety.  
If an accident occurs, it is important that a tunnel operator is able to quickly 
assess the situation, and respond to the problem immediately (fire verification system). 
Real-time information about events is essential so that tunnel operators can make 
appropriate response plans. CCTV and emergency telephones installed in road tunnels 
provide the means to verify the severity of a tunnel fire. A 60-second time line is 
allocated in which to verify and identify fires.  
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There are two basic types of ventilation airflow systems applied in road tunnels: 
longitudinal and transverse. In a longitudinal ventilation system, the airflow moves 
through the tunnel and essentially moves pollutants and/or heated gases along using 
incoming fresh air taken from the beginning of the tunnel or tunnel section, and 
discharges heated or polluted air at the tunnel portal, or at the end of the tunnel 
section (see Figure 1-1). Longitudinal ventilation can be configured either portal to 
portal (short road tunnel sections), portal to shaft, or shaft to shaft (long road tunnel 
sections). In a transverse ventilation system, the transverse flow is created by the 
uniform distribution of fresh air and/or uniform collection of vitiated air, along the 
length of the tunnel. The uniform distribution and collection of air throughout the 
length of the tunnel will provide a consistent level of temperature and pollutants 
throughout. Normally, tunnel ventilation systems will take between 60 and 120 
seconds from standstill to full rotational speed.  
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Figure 1-1: An example of a longitudinal ventilation system 
 
Fire fighting systems can be categorized into five types: extinguishers, hose 
reels, fire hydrants, suppression systems, and water spray / water mist.  
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1.3 Quantitative Risk Analysis Models 
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) models have evolved from the application of 
reliability and statistics to engineering design, and are proven to be an efficient and 
effective methodology for quantitatively assessing the risks of hazardous installations. 
In the 1950s, a report issued by the US Atomic Energy Commission proposed a model 
to estimate risks (in terms of deaths, injuries and land contamination) of catastrophic 
accidents at nuclear power plants, with major radioactive releases. However, it was 
only in 1975 that a full-scale study, using numerical techniques to evaluate the 
probabilities and consequences of large accidents involving nuclear power reactors, 
was published in the US (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). This landmark 
study introduced QRA, essentially in the form that we use today, as a numerical tool 
for evaluating the safety level of hazardous installations. Since then, we have seen a 
number of methodological applications in various industries (e.g. Collins and Cooley, 
1983; Beim and Hobbs, 1997; Zhang and Yan, 1999; Persson, 2002; Zhang et al., 
2004; etc.).  
Figure 1-2 shows the standard framework illustrating how a QRA model is 
applied using four typical steps. Jonkman et al. (2003) and Vrouwenvelder et al. 
(2001), described how a QRA model can be decomposed into four steps, namely, 
qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, risk evaluation, and risk control/reduction. 
Similarly, discussions about the standard framework for carrying out QRA can also be 
found in references published by NASA (2002), Molag and Trijssenaar-Buhre (2006), 
Beard and Cope (2007), and Botschek et al. (2007). Qualitative analysis focuses on 
attempting to find out the top event which may cause a severe accident, that is fires in 
road tunnels, through historical accident analysis and/or expert judgment. In Step 2, 
quantitative analysis, a fault tree is built to estimate the frequency of the top event, 
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and an event tree is constructed to fractionize the top event into a number of accident 
scenarios which may lead to high consequences. Consequence estimation models are 
developed to calculate the consequences of each possible accident scenario (by 
spreadsheet model, numerical model, or simulation model). Having obtained the 
frequency and consequences of each possible accident scenario, risk indices are 
proposed and used in Step 3 to assess the risks. If the risks estimated by the model are 
not acceptable, based on a predetermined safety target, risk control/management 




Figure 1-2: Demonstration of the framework for conducting QRA 
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1.4 Research objective and research methodology  
The research objectives of this study is, in accordance with the PSR procedure 
manual for roads in Singapore, to build a quantitative risk assessment and quantitative 
risk control/management strategies for Singapore’s road tunnels to support decision 
makers from Land Transport Authority of Singapore. The methodology could also be 
generalized to the risk analysis for other types of road tunnels.  
The traditional four-step QRA modelling framework is applied in this study. 
First, fire is indentified as top event. Second, the fault tree and event tree are built in 
this step. The fault tree is built to estimate the frequency of fire in road tunnels, which 
is an important input parameter for a QRA model. The event tree is constructed to 
divide the top event into a number of accidental scenarios (leaf nodes of the tree) with 
certain frequencies and consequences. Third, the risk index is proposed to combine 
the frequencies and consequences of various possible scenarios to evaluate the risk 
level of a road tunnel. Fourth, if the tunnel risks exceed a predetermined safety target, 
the quantitative risk control/management would be done accordingly.  
1.5 Flow of the thesis 
According to Jonkman et al. (2003), there are two components of quantitative 
risk analysis models: quantitative risk assessment and quantitative risk 
control/management. This thesis addresses both components in the context of 
quantitative risk analysis for urban road tunnels. As can be seen in Figure 1-3, there 
are 8 chapters in the thesis. Following the introduction and literature review in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the frequency estimation model for fire in road tunnels is proposed 
in Chapter 3. According to the model proposed in this chapter, the frequency of fire in 
one particular road tunnel section could be calculated, given the traffic conditions in 
this tunnel section are available. The frequencies of fire in tunnel sections are the 
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most important input parameters for the two risk assessment models: QRAM-I 
developed in Chapter 4 and QRAM-II developed in Chapter 6. QRAM-I could 
estimate the individual risk and societal risk for a whole road tunnel by taking into 
account the non-homogeneous characteristics of the tunnel. QRAM-II aims to 
evaluate the impact of parameter uncertainty by looking into a particular road tunnel 
section (normally the riskiest tunnel section or the longest tunnel section) to capture 
more information about the risks. On the basis of the two quantitative risk assessment 
models, two quantitative risk control/management strategies are proposed in Chapters 
5 and 7, respectively. Chapter 5 focuses on the risk control/management strategies for 
existing road tunnels and Chapter 7 put forth the risk control/management strategies 
for planning road tunnels.  
 
 
Figure 1-3: Flowchart of the thesis 




Chapter 1 describes the research objective and motivations of this study. First, 
the characteristics of non-homogeneous urban road tunnels are introduced. Second, 
fire, the most disastrous event in road tunnels, is discussed. Third, the research 
motivations are pointed out - QRA for urban road tunnels has become an explicit 
requirement recently in the EU, the Netherlands and Singapore. Chapter 2 
summarizes and reviews relevant studies on the topic. First, the causes of fire 
disasters are presented. Accordingly, it is of great importance to develop a robust and 
accurate model to estimate vehicle crash frequencies (as detailed in Chapter 3). 
Second, the tunnel safety provisions and accident response plan for Singapore’s road 
tunnels are introduced. Third, the existing QRA models and risk indices for urban 
road tunnels are examined. Fourth, the issue of parameter uncertainty, and the fact 
that deterministic numbers are not appropriate to represent them, is pointed out.  
Chapter 3 develop a model to estimate the frequency of fires in urban road 
tunnels. The fault tree model developed by Land Transport Authority of Singapore is 
applied to estimate the frequency of fire. According to LTA (2006), the vehicle crash 
frequency is the most important contributing factor to fires in urban road tunnels. 
Thus, a new vehicle crash estimation model is proposed, using detailed traffic data. 
According to the proposed model, the frequencies of fire occurred in different tunnel 
locations (with different traffic volumes) could be estimated. These fire frequencies 
are the most important input parameters for QRA models of road tunnels.  
Chapter 4 builds a deterministic QRA model (QRAM-I) for non-homogeneous 
urban road tunnels. In the proposed model, a non-homogeneous urban road tunnel is 
segmented into a number of homogeneous road tunnel sections, based on a proposed 
tunnel segmentation principle. For distinct tunnel sections with different traffic 
volumes, the corresponding crash frequencies can be estimated using the model 
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proposed in Chapter 3; then, a fire simulation model and the fractional effective dose 
(FED) methodology are applied to estimate the number of fatalities under different 
accident scenarios, by taking into account the different working statuses of tunnel 
safety provisions. Having obtained the frequencies and consequences of each possible 
accident scenario for the homogeneous tunnel section, the individual risk and societal 
risk of that tunnel section can be calculated. Finally, an aggregate QRA model is built 
by integrating the section-based QRA models. The model is further computerized as 
software, to help tunnel operators evaluate risks in urban road tunnels. The model and 
software have been applied by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore to assess 
the risks of urban road tunnels in the country.  
Chapter 5 addresses the risk control/management strategies for operating tunnels, 
on the basis of QRAM-I. Once a tunnel is open to traffic, the only parameters that 
tunnel operators can adjust to control/manage the risks are traffic volumes and the 
proportion of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV). A risk impact analysis methodology is 
proposed in this chapter. An excess risk index is defined, to quantify the severities of 
unacceptable scenarios, which place road tunnels above a predetermined safety target. 
A contour chart, based on the excess risk index, could be used to help tunnel operators 
implement suitable risk control/management solutions. The analysis shows that the 
maximum tolerable traffic volume is 1,200 vehicles/hour·lane, and the maximum 
acceptable proportion of HGVs is 18% of the total traffic volume.  
Chapter 6 develops a QRA model for a particular road tunnel section with 
parameter uncertainty (QRAM-II). In QRAM-I, a number of input parameters possess 
epistemic or aleatory uncertainty. In QRAM-II, aleatory uncertainty is formulated 
using probability distribution functions, while parameters with epistemic uncertainty 
are represented by fuzzy numbers. A hybrid Monte Carlo simulation-based approach 
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is designed to propagate the parameter uncertainty in the framework of the QRA 
model, by taking into account the dependencies among these uncertain parameters. 
Finally, percentile-based individual risk and  -cut based societal risk are considered 
the most appropriate indices to support tunnel operators with distinct risk attitudes.  
Chapter 7 addresses the optimal selection of tunnel safety provisions on the 
basis of QRAM-II. Tunnel safety provisions are features of urban road tunnels, which 
are installed and implemented to reduce tunnel risks. In practice, the selection of these 
safety provisions is based on expert judgment. In this study, an optimization model is 
proposed to obtain the optimal solution for the selection of tunnel safety provisions. 
The objective function minimizes the life-cycle costs of tunnel safety provisions, 
subject to the requirements for tunnel safety provisions, and the safety targets. Finally, 
by taking advantage of the special structure of the optimization model, a Bi-Section 
Search and Bound Algorithm (BSSBA) is designed, to efficiently solve the problem.  
Chapter 8 draws conclusions and recommends future research work.  
 
  









CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The Causes of Fire Disasters 
According to the US Fire Administration (USFA, 1999), the causes of vehicle 
fires can be divided into four categories: vehicle defects, an act of carelessness, arson, 
or the aftermath of a collision. A damaged fuel line, resulting in a spray of flammable 
fuel on a hot engine, the overheating of braking systems, and sparks, are all possible 
vehicle defects which could result in vehicle fire. Careless acts include causes such as 
dropped lights, naked lights, and cigarettes discarded on upholstery. Kocsis (2002) 
proposed that there are six types of intentional act: a profit motive, animosity crime, 
crime concealment, vandalism, personality disorder, and political objectives such as 
terrorism.  
Based on statistics compiled in the Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety, 55 out of 
61 cases of fires in road tunnels are caused by vehicle crashes. According to the 
Design Safety Submission for tunnels (LTA, 2005), vehicles crashes also contributed 
to around 2/3 of tunnel fires. Therefore, vehicle crashes are considered as the major 
cause for tunnel fire in this study.  
 
2.2 QRA Models and Risk Indices 
2.2.1 QRA Models  
As mentioned in the introductory section, in 1975, a full-scale study, using 
numerical techniques to evaluate the probabilities and consequences of large accidents 
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involving nuclear power reactors, was published in the US (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 1975). This landmark study introduced QRA, essentially in the form 
that we use today, as a numerical tool for evaluating the risks of hazardous 
installations. In the past thirty years, we have seen a number of applications of the 
QRA model. Such studies have included electrical accident countermeasure systems 
for mines (Collins and Cooley, 1983), fusion fission hybrid reactor failures (Yang and 
Qiu, 1993), water resource planning (Beim and Hobbs, 1997), steam generator tube 
ruptures (Zhang and Yan, 1999), and emergency response in the context of chemical 
hazards or spills (Raman, 2004; Zhang et al., 2004). In the 1990s, researchers began 
to apply the methodology to assess the risks in homogeneous road tunnels (Arends et 
al., 2005; PIARC, 2008; Saccomanno and Haastrup, 2002). All these case studies 
show the usefulness and suitability of the QRA methodology to this type of problem.  
The conventional four-step QRA framework includes qualitative analysis, 
quantitative analysis (frequency and consequence analysis), risk evaluation, and risk 
control/management, with the fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and consequence 
estimation models in Step 2 the critical components. Fault trees, which are used to 
estimate the frequencies of top events, are made up of several photographical 
diagrams showing how the undesired states of a system can be analysed, using 
Boolean logic to combine series of low-level sub-events. They present all possible 
causes of a single event, using binary logic gates controlled by the Boolean values, 
resembling a “root system rising to a main stem”. The tree starts from the top event 
and works downwards towards the various scenarios. These scenarios can be further 
defined until the basic events are reached. Figure 2-1 shows an example of a fault tree 
for a fire in a road tunnel. The top event may trigger a series of simple events with 
distinct results (frequencies and consequences). These simple events can be 
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represented logically by an event tree, which is a tree diagram referring to complex 
events that can be fractionized in terms of their distinction by subsequent events. 
Figure 2-2 shows an event tree for a fire in a tunnel. Consequence estimation models 
are developed to estimate the consequences of each possible accident scenario (the 
leaf node of the event tree). Once the frequencies and consequences of all possible 
accident scenarios have been obtained, a risk assessment can be carried out.  
 
 
Figure 2-1: A fault tree 




Figure 2-2: An event tree 
 
2.2.2 Risk Indices  
Risk indices have evolved in parallel with the development of QRA, as an 
integral analytical technique. In 1967, Farmer’s pioneer paper defined the concept of 
risk in terms of a “probability consequence diagram” (Farmer, 1967). Individual risk 
(IR) and societal risk (SR) were defined and have gradually been recognized by 
researchers and industry as two risk indices that can be used to evaluate the safety 
level of a hazardous installation (Meng et al., 2009; PIARC, 2008).  
The individual risk (IR), as used by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment (VROM), is defined as the probability that an average 
unprotected person, permanently present at a certain location, is killed due to an 
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accident resulting from a hazardous activity (Bottelberghs, 2000; Jonkman et al., 
2003). Assuming that, during the use of a tunnel, say, a hazardous situation iH  may 
cause a set of events ijE (for example, a fully developed fire, or explosion), let ijp  
denote the probability that the user loses his life. Then, the individual risk of that 
person can be estimated using the following formal expression (Holický, 2007): 
 
    ij ij i i
ij
IR p P E H P H   (2.1) 
 
where  iP H   denotes the probability that the hazardous situation iH  occurs, e.g. the 
collision in the road tunnel, ( )ij iP E H  denotes the probability that event ijE  is 
triggered by situation iH , and ijp  denotes the probability that a tunnel user is killed 
because of event ijE .  
Another commonly used measure of IR is passenger fatalities per total passenger 
traffic. Thus, IR is a fatality rate, not a probability. Four other expressions of IR were 
also mentioned by Jonkman et al. (2003): 
(1) the loss of life expectancy: this indicates a reduction in life expectancy due 
to various incidents; 
(2) the delta yearly probability: the intensity with which a given activity would 
need to be executed in order to increase the probability of death by 10-6 per year; 
(3) the activity-specific hourly mortality rate: this reflects the probability of 
becoming a fatality in a given time unit when engaging in a particular activity; 
(4) the death per unit activity: for example, the risk of travel by car or train can 
be represented by the number of deaths per kilometre travelled.  
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The conventional measure of IR defined by eqn. (2.1) was originally used to 
evaluate the risk of residents living close to nuclear power plants, under the 
assumption that the residents were permanently present at the location (as they lived 
nearby), which is unrealistic for road tunnel motorists and passengers. Instead, 
motorists and passengers enter and exit road tunnels from time to time rather than 
being permanently present at one location. Accordingly, the definition is not suited to 
road tunnel risk assessment. In this case, IR should be considered as the risk to 
individual tunnel users with distinct travel profiles.  
The other widely-used risk index, SR, is defined as the relationship between 
frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm, in a 
given population, due to the realization of specified hazards (Ball and Floyd, 1998). 
SR can be sub-classified into the following four categories: 
(1) Collective Risk: The risks associated with diffuse effects as a result of 
normal activities. For example, risks related to the radioactive discharges from 
incinerators working under normal conditions.  
(2) Simple Societal Risk: This is related to hazardous installations where the 
predominant issue is human safety. This is the most widely used type of risk and 
is based on likelihood. Simple societal risks are illustrated by an F/N curve, 
which provides a graphical method of evaluating the consequences of incidents. 
(3) Diverse Societal Risk: This can be applied to more complicated situations 
where other kinds of harm need to be considered, such as oil spills from tankers. 
The F/N curve is not sufficient in such situations. For example, in incidents 
involving maritime oil transport, the total harm is not only a function of human 
fatalities, but also of environmental pollution. In such cases, diverse societal 
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risk can be used to evaluate the impact of incidents on human beings and the 
environment.  
(4) Societal Concerns: This is associated with strategic-level decision making 
where political and other factors are involved. 
In risk assessments for road tunnels, researchers usually apply simple societal 
risk to represent the risks to all tunnel users. Simple societal risk (shortened to societal 
risk hereafter) can be represented graphically in the form of an F/N curve. The 
concept of using F/N curves to represent societal risk has been applied in all the 
existing QRA models. The curve reflects the relationship between the frequencies and 
number of fatalities for all possible scenarios on a double logarithmic scale. Let 
 kF N  denote the cumulative frequency of all accident scenarios in tunnel section k  
with N or more fatalities. We thus have: 
 






F N F x N k K

        (2.2) 
 
where jkx is the number of fatalities caused by accident scenario j  in tunnel section 
k  and the indicator function  jkx N   has the expression: 
 
   1,  if 





   
 (2.3) 
 
Using the frequency shown in eqn. (2.2), the expected value of the number of 
fatalities in road tunnel section k per year (EVk) can be calculated as 
 










   (2.4) 
 
The upper bound curve for societal risk has been adopted by various countries as 
a safety target, namely,  
 
   kCF N N  (2.5) 
 
where the parameters k and C specify the steepness and intercept of the safety target. 
Equivalently, eqn. (2.5) can also be represented as 
 
       log log logk N F N C   (2.6) 
 
It should be noted that k represents the slope, that is the gradient of the safety 
target, and C denotes the intercept, that is a constant value that determines the position 
of the target. Different combinations of k and C express various degrees of strictness 
of the safety target. As a result, different countries can propose their own safety 
targets by choosing these parameters. 
There are two principles to choose risk indices: straightforward and 
representative. A good risk index should be a straightforward value or simple figure 
representing the risk level of the hazardous installations. In this regards, the individual 
risk and simple societal risk are good risk indices with simple form and a practical 
meaning to represent risk levels.  
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2.3 QRA Models for Road Tunnels and Safety Targets   
2.3.1 QRA Models for Road Tunnels 
QRA models for road tunnels have been carried out and financially supported by 
various international and national organizations, including the OECD, PIARC, TNO 
in the Netherlands, and INERIS in France. In addition to academic studies on the use 
of QRA for road tunnels, some countries have developed their own QRA models 
specifically for their own road tunnels. Some examples include the OECD/PIARC 
model, the Dutch TUNprim model, Austria’s TuRisMo model, the Italian risk analysis 
model, the French model, and the TUSI model (Meng et al., 2009; PIARC, 2008), 
among others. Out of these, the Dutch model and the OECD/PIARC model are well 
recognized by researchers and the authorities for land transport in various countries 
(Meng et al., 2009).  
The Dutch scholars have dedicated a lot of effort to the development of QRA 
models for road tunnels, and a significant body of work is based on their study 
experiences. An integrated safety philosophy was proposed by Worm and Hoeksam 
(1998), to provide a concept for analysing the Westerschelde Tunnel in Southwest 
Netherlands. The potential for the concept to be used for future underground projects 
was also addressed. With the aim of building a basis on which to establish safety 
objectives and criteria for underground infrastructures, the TUNprim QRA model, 
programmed in a spreadsheet, was designed to calculate internal safety in two-bore 
tunnels with uni-directional traffic in each bore, during normal operation (Weger et al., 
2001; Brussaard et al., 2001). To probe the possibility of improving QRA for tunnels, 
Soons et al. (2006) compared QRA modelling of tunnel safety with its applications in 
the food industry, the chemical industry, and the aviation and nuclear industry. They 
found that QRA modelling of tunnel safety is limited by the uncertainties in inputs 
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and outputs, due to data shortages. The paper suggested that human factors, 
probabilities of failures of tunnel safety provisions, and people’s self-rescue activities, 
should all be included, to improve the performance of the models. However, to date, 
no QRA models for road tunnels exist that address the uncertainty representation and 
propagation problem. Accordingly, the representation and propagation of parameter 
uncertainty needs to be addressed and discussed so as to improve QRA models for 
urban road tunnels.  
In a project launched in 1995 regarding the transport of dangerous goods 
through road tunnels (Project ERS2), co-sponsored by the PIARC Tunnel Committee 
and the Road Research Division of the OECD, a PIARC/OECD/EU QRA model was 
developed for risk estimates associated with the transport of dangerous goods through 
road tunnels, incorporating 13 fire-related hazardous top events; spreadsheet-based 
software was created to computerize the model (Lacroix et al., 1999; Knoflacher et al., 
2002; PIARC, 2008). The software was applied to the existing tunnels in Austria, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. This model and the 
accompanying software have significantly promoted the development of QRA models 
for road tunnels. In order to examine the risk levels in Austrian road tunnels, and the 
risk mitigation measures required, Knoflacher and Pfaffenbichler (2004) applied the 
software to analyze the risks in 13 selected Austrian tunnels. It has also been 
employed to analyse potential risk in road tunnels in the UK, France and the US 
(Colorado DoT, 2006; PIARC, 2008). Furthermore, the model is discussed with 
respect to different aspects, such as risk reduction measures and engineering 
applications, by Cassini (1998) and Saccomanno and Haastrup (2002). Botschek et al. 
(2007) presented a new QRA model, which can be applied to all tunnels equipped 
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with mechanical ventilation systems and catered to the demands of the Austrian 
Ministry.  
Table 2-1 lists the model structures, consequence estimation models, and safety 
targets of two of the above models, OECD/PIARC and TUNprim. As can be seen in 
the table, the OECD/PIARC model focuses on the risk analysis of hazardous material 
transportation in road tunnels, while the Dutch TUNprim model was built for 
homogeneous road tunnels. The Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) had 
earlier proposed the idea of dividing a tunnel into a number of homogeneous portions, 
for the risk assessment of the transportation of hazardous materials, in 1995 (CCPS, 
1995). In their model, all of the parameters involved in risk calculations (accident 
frequency, scenario probability, population at risk, etc.) for each homogeneous 
portion, were assumed to be constant.  




Table 2-1: Model structures, consequence estimation models, and risk indices in existing QRA models 
Models Procedure  Consequence estimation  Risk index 
PIARC/OECD/EU 
QRAM 
(1) Option of a restricted number of dangerous 
goods. 
(2) Option of representative accident scenarios 
involving those dangerous goods. 
(3) Identification of physical effects of those 
scenarios on an open-air or road tunnel 
section. 
(4) Evaluations of their physiological effects 
on road or rail users and on the local 
population, taking into account possibilities 
for escape/sheltering; 
(5) Determination of yearly frequency of 
occurrence of each scenario. 
The consequences of a restricted 
number of scenarios is examined, 
including: 
(1) Physical modelling of the 
effects: explosions, fire or toxic 
releases. 
(2) Effects on road/rail users and 
local population. 






(1) Identification of initial events. 
(2) Identification of accident scenarios in an 
event tree, each branch of the event tree is a 
scenario. 
(3) Frequency calculation for each scenario. 
(4) Consequence estimation for each scenario. 
(5) Calculation of the overall risk. 
Consequence for each scenario is 
calculated as the number of fatalities.  
Evacuation possibilities: 
(1) Free fleeing distance 
(2) Traffic jam 
Individual risk  
Societal risk 
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2.3.2 Safety Targets  
In order to evaluate whether or not a hazardous installation is risky, various 
countries have proposed their own safety targets. Table 2-2 lists the different 
individual risk values published in various research papers. Table 2-3 gives the upper 
and lower bounds of the F/N curve (societal risk) used in various countries. The upper 
bound and lower bound curves can be expressed by a general formula, whereby C1/Nk 
and C2/Nk show the minimum and maximum acceptable societal risk. 
 
  1 2xk kC Cf NN N   (2.7) 
 
Table 2-2: Safety targets for individual risks  
Presented in Explanations Individual Risk
ISO 2394 
(1998) 
Loss of life due to structural failure or due to 




In industrial conditions. ≤10-3 
Holický (2007) Most industrial areas. [10-6, 10-3] 
Jonkman et al. 
(2003) 
Proposed by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment. 
≤ 10-6 
Employees (Rail). ≤ 10-4 
Passengers or users. ≤ 10-5 
Arends et al. 
(2005) and 
Vrouwenvelde
r et al. (2001) 
Persons living near the tunnel. ≤ 10-6 
 




Table 2-3: Upper and lower bounds used in various countries 
Tolerable Non-tolerable 
COUNTRY 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Austria 410 / N  110 / N  
Denmark NA 2 210 / N  
Hong Kong NA 210 / N  
Netherlands NA 3 210 / N  
Switzerland NA 410 / N  
United Kingdom NA 110 / N  
Source: All safety targets were obtained from Beard and Cope (2007) and Jonkman et 
al. (2003)  
The standards by Austria, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and UK are called risk 
neutral. The safety targets by Denmark and Netherlands are called risk averse. In 
these cases, larger accidents are weighted more heavily and are thus only accepted 
with a relatively lower probability.   
 
2.4 Parameter Representations in Existing QRA Models 
In the existing QRA models for road tunnels, all input parameters are taken to be 
deterministic numbers, with no account taken of parameter uncertainty (PIARC, 
2008). However, quite a number of the input parameters possess various types of 
uncertainty. For example, the failure probability of the tunnel safety provisions, which 
are considered hardware-failure-dominated (HFD) events, includes randomness 
caused by inherent variability, while some other parameters may include other types 
Chapter 2 Literature Review   
 
29 
of uncertainty, due to lack of information. Accordingly, as suggested by Ferson and 
Ginzburg (1996), distinct representation models are needed to adequately account for 
this random variability (also referred to as aleatory uncertainty) and imprecision (also 
referred to as epistemic uncertainty). It is unrealistic and inappropriate to represent the 
input parameters to a QRA model as deterministic numbers. Thus, distinct approaches 
should be applied to represent and propagate both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty.  
 
2.5 Limitations of the Existing Literature   
Based on the literature review presented above, it can be concluded that there 
are four limitations in the existing QRA studies relating to road tunnels, as follows:  
(1) Majority of the tunnel fires are caused by vehicle crashes. Evidently, vehicle 
crashes are the most important contributing factor behind fires in urban road 
tunnels and should be include in any risk assessment. As this is so important, 
it may not be appropriate to estimate the frequency of vehicle crashes by 
taking an average of historical records, especially for newly-opened road 
tunnel sections, with little historical data. Therefore, a robust model of the 
frequency of vehicle crashes is needed (as detailed in Chapter 3).  
(2) Non-homogeneous urban road tunnels are different from traditional road 
tunnels due to their non-homogeneity of traffic and geometric parameters. 
Previous QRA models cannot simply be applied to assess the risks in non-
homogenous urban road tunnels, and non-homogeneous urban road tunnels 
cannot be examined homogeneously without taking the multifarious 
geometric layouts of their tunnel sections into account. In addition, the 
conventional definition of IR is not suitable for the risk assessment of road 
tunnels, as tunnel users are not permanently present at a specific location in 
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a tunnel. Necessary revisions to the definition of IR need to be made in order 
to assess the risks for road tunnel users. Therefore, a new QRA model need 
be developed for non-homogeneous urban road tunnels (as detailed in 
Chapter 4).  
(3) Parameter uncertainty should also be taken into consideration. A number of 
the parameters involve uncertainty from various origins. It is inappropriate 
to neglect this parameter uncertainty in risk assessments, as it may lead to 
unreliable results. Accordingly, the representation and propagation of 
parameter uncertainty should be addressed in the QRA framework (as 
detailed in Chapter 6).  
(4) The existing QRA models mainly focus on risk assessment, and little has 
been quantitatively analyzed in the area of risk control/management in urban 
road tunnels. In practice, risk control/management solutions need to be 
implemented if tunnels do not pass the predetermined safety target. These 
risk control/management strategies have to be quantitatively discussed in 
relation to the risk assessment models (as detailed in Chapters 5 and 7). 
 
2.6 Research Scope 
The research scope of this study can be summarized as follows.  
(1) A model is developed to estimate the frequency of vehicle crashes in road 
tunnel sections. As a result, the frequency of fires in urban road tunnels is 
estimated using the fault tree technique (as detailed in Chapter 3).  
(2) A QRA model (QRAM-I) is developed for fires in non-homogeneous urban 
road tunnels, taking into account the distinct tunnel parameters in each 
section (as detailed in Chapter 4).   
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(3) A QRAM-I based risk impact analysis approach is proposed to examine the 
traffic flows in Singapore’s road tunnels. A risk contour chart is provided to 
support the tunnel operators from the Land Transport Authority of Singapore 
in controlling/managing the risks (as detailed in Chapter 5).  
(4) A QRA model for a road tunnel section, with parameter uncertainty 
(QRAM-II) is developed in order to address uncertainties due to inherent 
variability and lack of knowledge. A Monte Carlo simulation-based 
approach is applied to propagate the parameter uncertainties in the QRA 
model. Percentile-based individual risk and  -cut-based societal risks are 
also proposed; these risk indices are considered the most appropriate 
solutions for tunnel operators with distinct risk attitudes to assess the safety 
level of a road tunnel (as detailed in Chapter 6).  
(5) A QRAM-II based approach is proposed to optimally select the tunnel safety 
provisions in non-homogeneous urban road tunnels, under safety target 
constraints. By taking advantage of the special structure of the problem, a 
BSSBA is designed to efficiently solve the problem.   
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CHAPTER 3 FREQUENCY ESTIMATION FOR FIRE IN URBAN ROAD 
TUNNELS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
As acknowledged by the previous QRA models for road tunnels, frequency of 
fire in road tunnels is the most important contributing factor for the risks (Meng et al., 
2009; PIARC, 2008). Therefore, frequency analysis is crucial to the reliability of a 
QRA model for urban road tunnels. Accordingly, it is important to develop a robust 
and reliable model to estimate the frequency of fire in road tunnels. In this chapter, we 
first developed a fault tree model for fire in urban road tunnels on the basis of expert 
judgment by experienced tunnel operators from Land Transport Authority of 
Singapore. Based on statistics compiled in the Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety, 55 
out of 61 cases of fires in road tunnels are caused by vehicle crashes. In Singapore, 
61.5% of tunnel fires are caused by vehicle crashes (LTA, 2005). Therefore, vehicle 
crashes are major cause for tunnel fire. In this regard, a method is further proposed to 
accurately estimate the frequency of vehicle crashes in urban road tunnels with 
distinct traffic conditions. The traffic videos collected from Singapore’s road tunnels 
are applied to obtain the Time to Collision (TTC) distributions, concluding that 
Inverse Gaussian distribution is the best-fitted distribution to TTC samples. Then, an 
Inverse Gaussian regression model is used to establish the relationship between TTC 
samples and their corresponding contributing factors. We then proceed to introduce a 
new concept of exposure to traffic conflicts as the mean sojourn time in a given time 
period that vehicles are exposed to dangerous scenarios, i.e. the TTCs are lower than a 
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predetermined threshold value. Finally, a crash frequency estimation method is 
proposed on the basis of the accident records provided by Historical Crash-Damage 
(HCD) database for Singapore’s road tunnels.  
 
3.2 Fault Tree for Fire in Road Tunnels     
The fault tree for fire in urban road tunnels is built by experienced tunnel 
operators from Land Transport Authority (LTA) of Singapore, which is depicted in 
Figure 3-1. The circles attached to the leaf nodes of fault trees are the notations of 
input parameters to the fault tree. The meanings of notations in fault tree for fire in 
tunnel top event are explained in the figure. The probability of ignition when vehicle 
defects occur and probability of vehicle catching fire for collisions are constants 
provided by LTA. The frequencies of fire due to brake-overheating, an act of 
carelessness, and arson are relatively low in Singapore. Therefore, the frequency of 
vehicle crashes plays an essential role in the estimations of frequency of fire in urban 
road tunnels. In other words, the reliability of fault tree estimations relies on the 
credibility of frequency of vehicle crashes. Therefore, it is of great significance to 
develop a model to accurately estimate the frequency of vehicle crashes in urban road 
tunnels with distinct traffic conditions.  
According to the Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety (2006), fire could be resulted 
from vehicle defects, an act of carelessness, arson, and vehicle collisions. Thus, the 
first level of fault tree includes these four possible causes. The frequency of fire due 
to vehicle defects could be estimated by multiplying the frequency of vehicle defects 
(which could be obtainable from historical data) and probability of ignition when 
vehicle defects. Similarly, the frequency of fire due to vehicle collisions could be 
estimated by multiplying the frequency of vehicle collisions and probability of vehicle 
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catching fire in a crash event. Thus, the fault tree could be built. This fault tree model 
has been applied by Land Transport Authority of Singapore for 10 years and relevant 
coefficients have been calibrated and adjusted year by year. This model could be 
generalized to be used in other road tunnels. However, the coefficients should be 
further calibrated in accordance with the vehicle and traffic conditions in the tunnel.  
 
Fire in urban road tunnels
Fire due to vehicle 
defects
Fire due to collisionsFire due to an act of 
carelessness Fire due to arson
Chain Collision Single Collision
Frequency of 
vehicle crash








Fire due to vehicle 
defects







PI: Probability of ignition when vehicle defects take place
VD: frequency of vehicle defects
FBO: frequency of fire due to brake overheating
CLN: frequency of fire due to an act of carelessness
ARSON: frequency of fire due to arson
FCS: frequency of chain vehicle collision
SVCF: Ignition probability of vehicles involving in chain vehicle collision 
FCL: frequency of vehicle collision
LVCF: Ignition probability of vehicles involving in collision 
 
Figure 3-1: Fault tree for fire in tunnel top event 




3.3 Estimations of Vehicle Crash Frequencies in Road Tunnels     
3.3.1. Statistical Models for Crash Frequency Estimations in Open Roads 
A number of studies have been conducted to predict/estimate vehicle crash 
frequency on highways using crash-frequency data. However, identification of the 
cause and effect relationships is typical unavailable due to lack of microscopic traffic 
information (or the detailed driving data). Consequently, as pointed out by Lord and 
Mannering (2010), researchers have framed their analytic approaches to study the 
factors that affect the number of crashes occurring in some geographical space over 
some specified time period by using various types of count-data regression models in 
accordance to some assumptions. These models include Poisson regression model (e.g. 
Miaou and Lum, 1993; Miaou, 1994), Negative binomial/Poisson-Gamma model (e.g. 
Maycock and Hall, 1984; Malyshkina and Mannering, 2010a; Daniels et al, 2010), 
Zero-inflated Possion and negative binomial models (e.g. Maiou, 1994; Shankar et al., 
1997; Malyshkina and Mannering, 2010b; Lord et al., 2007), Conway-Maxwell-
Poisson model (e.g. Lord et al., 2008; Lord et al., 2010), and others (e.g. Zhang and 
Xie, 2007; Guo et al., 2010; Haque et al., 2009). The lack of the detailed driving data 
on highways makes those statistical analysis models biased to reflect the fundamental 
cause and effect relationship. Lord and Mannering (2010) thus highlight that the 
entirely new direction of research could potentially open up if the anticipated 
availability of the detailed driving data and crash data are available. 
More detailed traffic data are obtainable in road tunnels compared to highways 
because most of road tunnels are equipped with the closed circuit television (CCTV) 
cameras and/or an operation control centre (OCC). For example, each of Singapore’s 
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road tunnels has been installed 2 to 4 CCTV cameras every 200 meters and monitored 
by a twenty-four-hour manned operation control centre (OCC). These CCTV cameras 
record real time and detailed traffic information. In addition to hourly traffic volume 
and density, we can precisely measure/estimate the time to collision (TTC) for two 
consecutive vehicles moving in the same lane of a road tunnel using traffic videos 
recorded by these cameras. The TTC is defined as the time that remains until a 
collision between two vehicles would have occurred if the collision course and speed 
difference are maintained (Hayward, 1972). The TTC has been one of the well-
recognized safety indicators for traffic conflicts on highways (Farah, et al., 2009; 
Svensson, 1998; Chin et al., 1991; Chin et al., 1992; Chin and Quek, 1997). 
Minderhoud and Bovy (2001) further pointed out that it is inversely related to vehicle 
crash frequencies in road sections. It is widely accepted as a safety indicator in 
highways.  
The objective of this study is to develop a crash frequency estimation method on 
the basis of TTC distributions. The TTC sample data are collected from the traffic 
videos in Singapore’s road tunnels. Based on the statistical analysis, we find that the 
Inverse Gaussian distribution is the best-fitted distributions for the collected TTC 
samples. Accordingly, the Inverse Gaussian regression model is applied to establish 
the relationship between TTC distributions and the corresponding traffic volume. 
Having had the TTC distributions, a crash frequency estimation method is put up to 
establish the relationship between the TTC distributions and the crash frequencies.  
 
3.3.2. TTC Data Collection 
Assume that there are two consecutive vehicles moving in the same direction on 
the same lane of a road tunnel. Let leaderL  and followerL  be the locations of the leading 
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and following vehicles at a particular time, respectively. Correspondingly, let leaderL  
and followerL  denote the speeds of the leading and following vehicles at the particular 
time. According to the TTC definition, namely, the time that remains until a collision 
between two vehicles would have occurred if the collision course and speed difference 






,  if 
                    ,  otherwise
L L l L L
L LTTC
     
     (3.1) 
 
where leaderl  is the length of the leading vehicle. Eqn. (3.1) implies that the TTC is 
measurable if we have real time traffic information.  
To collect the TTC data in a road tunnel, the Kallang/Paya Lebar Expressway 
(KPE) and the Central Expressway (CTE) in Singapore shown in Figure 3-2 and 
Figure 3-3 are selected. KPE and CTE are two vital infrastructures in Singapore’s 
road system. The first one has a total length of 12 kilometers and 9 kilometers of the 
expressway (Figure 3-2) is built underground as a road tunnel, serving the growing 
traffic demand of the north-eastern sector of Singapore. The second one, a 17-
kilometer expressway, links the north and south of Singapore through the Central 
Business District (CBD). 2.4 kilometers of the expressway (Figure 3-3) are laid 
underground and these portions of the CTE form the first road tunnel in Singapore. 
Both road tunnels are equipped with the 24-hour OOC systems.  




Figure 3-2: General arrangement of KPE road tunnel 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Traffic videos recorded from CTE road tunnel 
  
We request 42-hour tunnel traffic videos recorded by CCTV of these two 
tunnels from Land Transport Authority of Singapore, including 14 locations for 3 
typical time periods - morning peak hour: 8:00 am to 9:00 am, off-peak hour: 14:00 
pm to 15:00 pm, evening peak hour: 19:00 pm to 20:00 pm - in Mar 2011. The TTC 
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samples are counted from these traffic videos in different time periods with different 
traffic conditions. The procedure of measuring a TTC with respect to a car-following 
scenario is summarized as follows. We first measure the length of the leading vehicle 
( leaderl ) in a car-following scenario (per lane basis). After that, the spot speeds of the 
vehicles ( follower leader and L L  ) can be estimated by measuring the time taken by the 
vehicle to cover two lane-markers’ distance in the video. Then, the time headway ( h ) 
between the leading and following vehicles is recorded. According to Vogel (2003), 
the gap size  leader follower leaderL L l   can be estimated by  follower leaderL h l  . Finally, 
the TTC for the car-following scenario could be calculated according to eqn. (3.1).  
In the measurement, we display 30 frames per second to obtain a better data 
accuracy. To sum up, 1,433 car following scenarios occurred in various locations are 
analyzed in this study. From the analysis, 604 TTC samples with respect to different 
traffic volumes are obtainable (TTC samples with finite values). Statistically, the 
number of TTC samples with finite values should be equal to that of samples with 
infinite values. Infinite TTC values indicate that the following vehicle will not be 
possible catch up with the leading one, which are absolutely safe situations. 
Accordingly, we would focus on the probability distributions of TTC samples with 
finite values. 
  
3.3.3. Inverse Gaussian Distribution for TTC  
3.3.3.1 Statistical analysis for the TTC samples 
A data analysis procedure is proposed in order to obtain the best-fitted TTC 
distributions. Five commonly used distributions are examined in this study: Inverse 
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Gaussian, Exponential, Normal, Triangular, and Lognormal. The maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) technique is employed to estimate the parameters involved in a 
distribution model. After obtaining the parameters for various types of distributions, 
the goodness-of-fit test is conducted to select the best-fitted distribution among the 
give candidate distributions. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, a nonparametric test, 
has been widely applied to compare a sample with a reference probability distribution 
in transportation studies (e.g. Ibeas et al., 2011; Páez et al., 2011). In this study, the K-
S test is also adopted to perform the goodness-of-fit test. The K-S statistic quantifies a 
distance between the empirical distribution function of the sample and the cumulative 
distribution function of the reference distribution. In this study, a distribution with the 
lowest K-S test statistic is regarded as the best-fitted distribution.  
According to the above-mentioned procedure, we analyze five sets of samples 
collected at different locations with respect to different traffic volumes, shown in 
Table 3-1.  Table 3-2 gives the best-fit analysis results.  
 
Table 3-1: TTC samples  
 Traffic volume (vehs/hour·lane) Number of samples 
Sample 1 894 104 
Sample 2 963 65 
Sample 3 1127 80 
Sample 4 1374 79 
Sample 5 1672 93 
Sample 6 1028 61 
Sample 7 1454 60 
Sample 8 1298 62 
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Table 3-2: Statistical analysis for the TTC samples 
Inverse Gaussian Lognormal Triangular  Exponential Uniform  Sa- 























































































(0, 62.25)  
0.4744 
* The K-S statistics of the best fitted distributions.
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According to Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, we can find that 
(1) The Inverse Gaussian distribution and lognormal distribution are considered 
as the best-fitted distributions for the cases 2 . Figure 3-4 depicts the 
histograms and empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) for data 
samples with the best-fitted distributions (traffic volume = 963 
vehs/hour·lane). 
(2) The TTC samples collected at different locations with respect to similar 
traffic volumes generally follows the same Inverse Gaussian distribution 
with the same parameters (e.g. Sample 1 and Sample 2, sample 3 and sample 
6). In other words, the traffic volume could be considered as the contributing 
factor for TTC distributions. 
(3) The TTC sample mean and its inverse both have a parabola relationship with 
traffic volume, as shown in Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6. This is because two 
contributing factors to TTC, distance headway and speed dispersion, are 
both dependent of the traffic volume. When traffic volume is low (<1000 
vehs/hour·lane), the great speed dispersion could result in low TTC values. 
However, when traffic volume is high (>1600 vehs/hour·lane), the small 
distance headway would lead to low TTC values.  
(4) The shape parameters ( ) of best fitted Inverse Gaussian distributions with 
respect to different traffic volumes are within a relatively small range from 
9.24 to 14.06.  
                                                 
2 Inverse Gaussian Distribution is a two parameter family of continuous probability distributions with support on 
(0,  ). Its probability density function is given by 
   
1 22




    
              
 
where  >0 is the mean and  >0 is the shape parameter. The distribution can be viewed as the distribution of first 
passage time of a Wiener process with an absorbing barrier, i.e., while the Gaussian describes a Brownian Motion's 
level at a fixed time (Wiener process), the inverse Gaussian describes the distribution of the time the Brownian 
Motion takes to reach a fixed positive level.  
 



























Figure 3-4: The histograms and empirical CDF (traffic volume = 963 vehs/hour·lane) 
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TTC Sample Mean - Traffic Volume Relationship
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Figure 3-5: TTC sample mean – traffic volume relationship 
 
Inverse of TTC Mean - Traffic Volume Relationship 
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Figure 3-6: Inverse of TTC mean – traffic volume relationship 
 
3.3.3.2 Estimation of the parameters defining Inverse Gaussian distribution  
To establish the relationship between TTC and traffic volume, an Inverse 
Gaussian regression model is formulated by assuming that traffic volume is the 
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contributing factor to TTC. To formulate the inverse Gaussian regression model, let 
,  1, , ,iy i n   be n independent observations (TTC samples) distributed as  ,iIG   , 
where the inverse of sample mean has a parabola relationship with traffic volume, 
represented by 20 1 2
1 0i i
i
x x       . Here x denote traffic volume. Whitmore 
(1983) derived the pseudo maximum likelihood estimators of   and   as  
 
   1ˆ ' '1X YX X   (3.2) 
  1ˆ ˆ1 1'Tn Y X   1  (3.3) 
 
where Y is the diagonal matrix with i-th diagonal elements being yi, 1 is the n-vector 
of all ones and  21, , 'i iX x x . These are called pseudo maximum likelihood 
estimators because the condition 20 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0i ix x     for all i is not guaranteed to be 
satisfied3. According to our TTC data with different traffic volumes (421 data samples 
for Locations 1 to 5), the estimated coefficients are 
 
 10ˆ 5.606 10    (3.4) 
 41ˆ 7.900 10     (3.5) 
 72ˆ 3.21 10    (3.6) 
 ˆ 12.17   (3.7) 
 
                                                 
3 The condition is guaranteed in this study since the traffic volume is with the range from 800 to 1700 
vehs/hour·lane. 
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Having had the estimated coefficients, the TTC distributions could be 
determined for different traffic conditions reflected by their traffic volumes. In order 
to evaluate how well the Inverse Gaussian regression model estimates the TTC 
distributions, we compare the derived TTC distributions with the TTC samples with 
different traffic volumes - 894 vehs/hour·lane, 963 vehs/hour·lane, 1,127 
vehs/hour·lane, 1,374 vehs/hour·lane, and 1,672 vehs/hour·lane) - by using the 
hypothesis test.  
The K-S test is applied to conduct the hypothesis test. The null hypothesis is 
rejected at level   if  
 nnD K  (3.8) 
where n is the number of samples, Dn is the K-S statistic, and K  is the critical value. 
The results of K-S tests are reported in Table 3-3.  
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K-S values (Dn) 
 
Critical value ( K ) 
 
Test results 
894 104 IG(9.02, 12.17) 0.0977 1.36 1.00<1.36 
963 65 IG(10.26, 12.17) 0.1086 1.36 0.88<1.36 
1,127 80 IG(12.33, 12.17) 0.1496 1.36 1.34<1.36 
1,374 79 IG(12.83, 12.17) 0.0821 1.36 0.73<1.36 
1,672 93 IG(7.30, 12.17) 0.1026 1.36 0.99<1.36 
 




As can be seen from Table 3-3, the K-S tests suggest the regression model 
performs well. Figure 3-7 depicts the CDF of the best fitted Inverse Gaussian 
distribution and the CDF generated by Inverse Gaussian regression for a TTC sample 
(traffic volume = 1,672 vehs/hour·lane), respectively. The two distributions both fit 
the TTC samples very well, namely, the distribution generated by Inverse Gaussian 
regression model is a good approximation of the best-fitted Inverse Gaussian 
distribution.  
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Figure 3-7: Empirical CDF with Inverse Gaussian distributions (traffic volume = 
1,672 vehs/hour·lane) 
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3.3.4. Crash frequency estimation model 
3.3.4.1 TTC threshold value and exposure to traffic conflicts  
A TTC threshold value is usually chosen to distinguish relatively safe situation 
and dangerous scenarios exposed to traffic conflicts (or critical encounters). Various 
opinions can be found from the literature as to which value should be used as the 
threshold value. Hirst and Graham (1997) reported that a time-to-collision measure of 
4 seconds could be used to discriminate between cases where drivers unintentionally 
find themselves in a dangerous situation from cases where drivers remain in control. 
Hogema and Janssen (1996) presented a minimum TTC value of 3.5 seconds for non-
supported drivers and 2.6 seconds for supported drivers. It is widely acknowledged 
that the TTC threshold should be 2 seconds to 5 seconds (Minderhoud and Bovy, 
2001; Vogel, 2003).  
We define the exposure to traffic conflicts as the mean sojourn time in a given 
time period (e.g. an hour) that vehicles are exposed to dangerous scenarios (or critical 
encounters), i.e. the TTCs are lower than a predetermined threshold value  . Having 
had the TTC distributions for road tunnel sections (Section 3.3.3), the hourly exposure 
to traffic conflicts can be quantified by eqn. (3.9). 
 
     ( 1) Pr 0.5 1conflictN K L TTC x          (3.9) 
 
where K denote the traffic density; L is the length of a road tunnel section; 
  P TTC x   represents the probability of TTC less than the threshold value  ; x is 
the traffic volume of the time period in the road tunnel section. Note that only half of 
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car following scenarios will result in finite TTCs and the other half is considered as 
absolutely safe situations (infinite TTCs).  
 
3.3.4.2 Historical Crash-Damage database  
Historical Crash-Damage (HCD) database is applied in order to examine the 
relationship between exposure to traffic conflicts and crash frequencies. According to 
the Motor Claims Framework (MCF) introduced by the General Insurance 
Association of Singapore (GIA), in the event of a crash in expressways, everyone 
involved must inform the insurance company within one day using the GIA Motor 
Accident Report form. In addition, according to Road Traffic Act in Singapore, 
another report must be made within 24 hours of a crash if an injury has occurred. The 
HCD database (2006-2008) has all the reported crash records, by means of either 
ways, occurred at Singapore expressways from 2006 to 2008, which includes the time 
of crash, location of crash, crash type (e.g. rear-end, skidded, chain collision, etc.), 
vehicle type (e.g. car-car, car-truck, etc.), number of slight injuries, number of serious 
injuries, and number of fatalities. To sum up, there are 2,324 crashes (4,650 vehicles 
involved) in the 17 km CTE expressways from 2006 to 2008, causing 6 fatalities, 160 
severe injuries, and 1,486 slight injuries.  
 
3.3.4.3 Relationship between exposure to traffic conflict and crash frequency   
In this section, we take 2 seconds, 3 seconds, and 4 seconds as examples of the 
TTC threshold values to illustrate the methodology. From the HCD database we get 
the crash frequencies in a one-km road tunnel section in CTE road tunnel are 11, 5, 8, 
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20, 17, and 4 for he time period 7:00 am to 8:00 am, 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm, 5:00 pm to 
6:00 pm, 8:00 pm to 9:00 pm, 9:00 am to 10:00 am, and 11:00 pm to 12:00 am from 
2006 to 2008, respectively. In the one-km tunnel section, there is a 2.4 meters wide 
shoulder and three 3.6 meters traffic lanes in each carriageway with a tunnel structural 
height of approximately 6 meters high. Both the curvature and gradient are very 
gentle in this section. We assume the TTC distributions follow the same pattern in 
shoulder lane, middle lane, and median lane. Therefore, we just measure the TTC for 
vehicles in the middle lane to represent the traffic state.  
We assume that the traffic volumes in the road tunnel section in a specific time 
period would not have significant daily variations. According to eqn. (3.9), the 
exposure to traffic conflicts could be calculated. The estimated traffic volumes, 
densities, and number of crashes are summarized in Table 3-4.  
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Table 3-4: Traffic volumes, density, length, crash records, and exposure to traffic conflicts for different time periods 
Exposure to Traffic Conflicts Time period R-E Crash records 
(2006-2008) 





(km/hour) 2s 3s 4s  
7:00am - 8:00am 11 1600 25 62 657 2024 3548 
1:00pm - 2:00pm 5 1200 16 73 263 829 1502 
5:00pm - 6:00pm 8 1400 20 70 364 1155 2070 
8:00pm - 9:00pm 20 1700 45 39 1566 4673 7998 
9:00pm - 10:00pm 17 1600 50 34 1341 4131 7243 
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We further analyze the relationship between exposure to traffic conflicts and the 
crash frequencies in a linear manner, which is presented in Figure 3-8 and  
Figure 3-9. The statistical results are reported in Table 3-5. Surprisingly, the P-
values of the coefficients with respect to constant for the three linear regression 
models are all greater than 0.035. By contrast, the P-values of coefficients with 
respect to crash frequency are all close to 0. That is to say, the coefficients with 
respect to intercept are very significant. The linear regression model with 0 intercept 
is depicted in Figure 3-9. According to the linear regression analysis, a linear 
relationship is observed between the crash rate and the proposed exposure to traffic 
conflicts. The corresponding proportional coefficient is defined as causation factor 
( ( )P t ) in a linear manner, which could be considered as the conditional probability 
that vehicle crashes could not be avoided under dangerous encounters for one hour. 
 
Table 3-5: Statistical results of linear regression models  
 Constant Crash frequency 




2s 2.5929 0.035 0.0111 2s 2.5929 
3s 2.4085 0.044 0.0037 3s 2.4085 
4s 2.2446 0.058 0.0022 4s 2.2446 
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Crash count - traffic conflicts relationship
y = 0.0022x + 2.2446
R2 = 0.9736
y = 0.0037x + 2.4085
R2 = 0.9744
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Figure 3-8: Crash count – traffic conflicts relationship with linear fit 
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Figure 3-9: Crash count – traffic conflicts relationship with linear fit (0 intercept) 
 
As suggested by Hauer et al. (1988), Lord and Mannering (2010), and Miaou 
and Lum (1993), it is theoretically inappropriate to model discrete and non-negative 
crash count data using the conventional linear regression method. Generalized linear 
modelling techniques (GLIM) have the advantages of overcoming the shortcomings 
Chapter 3 Frequency Estimation  
 
58 
associated with linear models. Therefore, the GLIM is applied to fit the model using a 
negative binomial distributed error structure.  
The Negative Binomial regression model considered in this study has the form 


















                       
 (3.10) 
 0,1,2,iy    (3.11) 
   , exp( )i i conflict iE Y N    (3.12) 
and the variance of Yi is   
   2i i iVar Y     (3.13) 
where Yi is a random variable representing the number of crashes in time period i; iy  
is the actual number of crash count in the time period; ,conflict iN  is the exposure to traffic 
conflicts in the time period; 0   and is referred to as dispersion parameter. 
According to the analysis in Section 4.3.1, it is reasonable to assume the mean value 
of crash count i  or  iE Y  to be proportional to the exposure to traffic conflicts. This 
model assumes an exponential rate function exp( ) , which ensures that the crash rate 
is always non-negative.  
The parameters ( and  ) are estimated by the three approaches (hybrid, fisher, 
and Newton Raphson methods) using the SPSS software. The three approaches 
deliver the same estimators for the two parameters, presented in Table 3-6.  
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Model 1 (2s) 0.044 -4.114 0.000 -19.777 41.554 
Model 2 (3s) 0.036 -5.244 0.000 -19.760 41.519 
Model 3 (4s) 0.031 -5.814 0.000 -19.767 41.493 
 
From Table 3-6, we can see the p-values are close to 0, indicating that the three 
models perform well. The Log-likelihood value and the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) value for each model are also given in the table. Note that estimated models 
with high Log-likelihood and low AIC values are preferred. Accordingly, the 
performances of the three models with respect to different TTC thresholds do not 
have substantial differences. Table 3-7 depicts the estimated expected values of crash 
counts by the three models and the actual crash count for the six data points in this 
study, which also indicate that the models perform very well. The proportional 
coefficients of the expected values of crash counts (with negative binomial 
assumption) over the exposure to traffic conflicts are 0163.0114.4 e , 0053.0244.5 e , 
and 0030.0814.5 e , respectively. These coefficients are the causation factors in 
regression models with generalized linear manner.  
  
Table 3-7: Estimated expected values of crash counts  
R-E Crash records 
(2006-2008) 
Estimated by model 
1 (2s) 
Estimated by model 2 
(3s) 
Estimated by model 3 
(4s) 
11 10.74 10.68 10.59 
5 4.30 4.38 4.48 
8 5.95 6.10 6.18 
20 25.59 24.67 23.87 
17 21.91 21.81 21.62 
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4 4.12 4.10 4.10 
 
3.3.4.3 Remark: sensitivity analysis for TTC threshold values   
According to the literature, the TTC threshold values range from 2 seconds to 5 
seconds (Minderhoud and Bovy, 2001; Vogel, 2003). Thus, a sensitivity analysis for 
TTC threshold values – 2 seconds, 2.5 seconds, 3 seconds, 3.5 seconds, 4 seconds, 4.5 
seconds, 5 seconds, 5.5 seconds, 6 seconds - is conducted to choose an appropriate 
TTC threshold value for the linear model. The average relative error method is a well 
recognized method to examine the goodness of fit of models in transportation studies 









   (3.14) 
where n is the number of samples; 'iy  is the actual crash count in the time period i; 
*
iy  is the predicted crash count in the time period i.  
The average relative errors for different TTC threshold values are given in Table 
3-8 and Figure 3-10.  
Table 3-8: average relative errors for different TTC threshold values  
TTC threshold values The average relative errors 
2.0 seconds 0.1362 
2.5 seconds 0.1302 
3.0 seconds 0.1323 
3.5 seconds 0.1220 
4.0 seconds* 0.1175* 
4.5 seconds 0.1177 
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5.0 seconds 0.1225 
5.5 seconds 0.1379 
6.0 seconds 0.1437 
 
According to the sensitivity analysis, the model performs best if the TTC 
threshold takes value of 4.0 seconds. As can be seen in Figure 3-10, the errors are 
sensitive to the TTC threshold values, especially if the values fall out of the range 3.5 
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Figure 3-10: average relative error – TTC threshold values chart 
3.3.5 Yearly crash frequency estimation 
As shown in Figure 3-9, there is a proportional relationship between the 
proposed index and crash count, mathematically 
    ,crash time conflictN N     (3.15) 
where     is the proportional coefficient with respect to the TTC threshold value   
(e.g.  4 0.0026  for linear model). Thus the number of crashes in this time period 
is obtainable given the traffic volume, density, and length of the tunnel section. The 
yearly crash frequency could be approximated by  







( ) ( 1) Pr 0.5 1n i i
crash year
i d





        (3.16) 
where i refers to different time periods; iK  and ix  is the density and volume in the 
time period i, respectively; dT  is the number of years with respect to analyzed crash 
data in HCD database (e.g. dT  = 3 years for the model in Section 3.3.4.3). 
 
3.3.6. Discussions  
 Theoretically, linear regression models are not appropriate to model discrete 
and non-negative crash count data. GLIM is proven to be more effective to formulate 
the rare events such as crash count. However, as illustrated in Section 4.3.1, the linear 
regression models also perform well according to the CURE method and correlation 
coefficients. Therefore, it is also acceptable to formulate the relationship between 
crash count and proposed index in this study. The coefficients between crash counts 
(or expected values of crash counts) and the exposure to traffic conflicts are defined 
as the causation factor in this study. The proposed causation factor ( )P t  reflects the 
conditional probability that vehicle crashes have occurred when the vehicle are 
exposed to dangerous scenarios for one hour. The probability would be dependent on 
vehicle conditions, drivers’ abilities, and the road geometries. We conjecture that this 
factor could be a constant for a given road tunnel section in the long run with a given 
TTC threshold value. The TTC values would generally have a parabola relationship 
with traffic volume because they will be affected by not only speed dispersion but 
also distance headways. For non-interrupt traffic flows with traffic volume from 900 
vehs/hour·lane to 1,700 vehs/hour·lane, the TTC distributions may follow the Inverse 
Gaussian distributions (lognormal distributions are also a good approximation) and 
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traffic volume could be considered as the contributing factor to the distribution 
parameters. It should be pointed out that these perspectives need to be validated using 
more actual data from other expressways and/or urban road tunnels.  
The crash data from Singapore’s road tunnels shows that linear or proportional 
relationship may not be good enough to reflect the relations between crash count and 
traffic volume. Instead, the linear and proportional relationships perform very well 
between crash count and exposure to traffic conflicts. This may be because not only 
traffic volume but also density is taken into consideration in the proposed exposure to 
traffic conflicts.  
Other than the TTC, the deceleration rate to avoid the crash (DRAC) and the 
post encroachment time (PET) have also been considered as good safety indicators to 
measure the safety level in roads (Meng and Weng, 2011; Cunto and Saccomanno, 
2008). Further study may be conducted to establish the relationship between crash 
frequency and the above-mentioned two safety indicators. The comparative analysis 
of these three safety indicators could also be studied accordingly. In addition, the 
model can also be applied to identify the hotspots in the urban road tunnels and/or 
expressways (Cheng and Washington, 2005; Montella, 2010).  
 
3.4. Conclusions   
In this chapter, we developed a fault tree to estimate the frequency of fire in 
urban road tunnels. According to the fault tree, we find that the reliability of 
frequency estimations for fire in road tunnels would be determined by the credibility 
of the estimated frequency of vehicle crashes. Accordingly, we shift our aim to find a 
better way to estimate the frequency of vehicle crashes. On the basis of literature 
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review, pure statistical models are usually applied to estimate the vehicle crash 
frequencies since the detailed driving data are generally unavailable in open roads. 
However, more detailed traffic data are obtainable in road tunnels compared to 
highways because most of road tunnels are equipped with the closed circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras and/or an operation control centre (OCC). Based on the available 
data, a crash estimation model is developed to estimate the frequency of vehicle 
crashes in urban road tunnels.  
According to the proposed model, density, traffic volume, tunnel length, and 
causation factor are the input parameters for the crash frequency for a particular road 
tunnel section. Therefore, the crash frequency for any tunnel sections could be 
estimated if all these traffic parameters are available. The frequency of fire in this 
road tunnel section could be estimated by the fault tree accordingly. This model will 
provide an important input parameter – frequency of fire in a road tunnel section.  
One limitation of this study is that the tunnel geometric characteristics are not 
taken into account. Future study could be focused on analyzing the impact of the 
parameters such as lane width, curvature, gradient, etc. Another limitation of this 
study is that the daily variation of traffic flow and the variation of traffic volume 
within one hour are not taken into account due to the difficulties in data collection. 
We assume that there do not exist substantial variation in traffic volume within one 
hour and from day to day.  
 




CHAPTER 4 QRA MODLE WITH DETERMINISTIC PARAMETERS FOR 
ROAD TUNNELS  
 
4.1 Introduction    
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is no generic QRA model which is able to 
assess the risks of non-homogeneous road tunnels. In addition, the conventional 
definition of individual risk is not applied to risk assessment for road tunnels. 
Accordingly, a QRA model is proposed to deal with the issues mentioned above. In 
the proposed model, a non-homogeneous road tunnel is segmented into a number of 
homogeneous road tunnel sections based on the tunnel segmentation principle in 
Section 4.2. For each particular tunnel section, a QRA model is developed to assess 
the individual risk and societal risk based on event tree analysis and consequence 
estimation models. An aggregated QRA model (QRAM-I) is thus built by integrating 
the section-based QRA models. The model has been applied to Singapore MCE road 
tunnels.  
 
4.2 Tunnel Segmentation Principle and Risk Indices   
4.2.1 Tunnel Segmentation Principle  
A non-homogenous urban road tunnel comprises multiple entry and exit slip 
roads as well as main tunnel bores hence possesses the non-homogeneous 
characteristics. The urban road tunnel segmentation principle aims to divide the whole 
road tunnel into several individual homogeneous sections. These homogeneous 
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sections can be classified into 3 types according to their geographical layouts and 
characteristics. Type I represents slip road sections, which is an enclosed roadway 
section entering or leaving the main road tunnel. Type II refers to road tunnel 
intersections. This section is where the traffic from slip road tunnels merges with 
main tunnels or leaves main tunnels to slip road tunnels. Type III represents main road 
tunnel sections. Figure 4-1 gives an example of how a road tunnel can be segmented 
according to the principle. The most substantial differences among tunnel sections are 
traffic conditions and geometric characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: An example for tunnel segmentation 
According to the model proposed in Chapter 3, the frequency of vehicle crash 
could be obtainable for any tunnel sections, given the tunnel length, density, and 
traffic volume. Thus the frequency of vehicle crash in the tunnel section could be 
considered as the input parameters of the fault tree. The frequency of fire in this 
particular tunnel section could be estimated by using the fault tree accordingly, which 
provide the most important input parameters for the frequency analysis in the event 
tree model.  
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4.2.2 Risk Indices   
The conventional definition of individual risk for road tunnels is not suited for 
road tunnel risk assessment. Assume that a non-homogenous urban road tunnel has K 
homogenous tunnel sections where K is a positive integer. IR for a particular 
homogeneous road section is defined as follows: “Individual risk of a road tunnel 
section is the probability that a particular unprotected individual is killed due to an 
incident resulting from a hazardous activity in the road tunnel section”. Different from 
the conventional definition of individual risk, the IR for road tunnel does not assume 
that a tunnel user is permanently present at a location. Instead, it reflects the risks 
exposed to individual tunnel user with distinct travel profiles. Let kIR denote the IR of 
















  (4.1) 
 
where kn  is the number of times that a given individual tunnel user passes through 
tunnel section k per year; Lk is the length of tunnel section k (km); I  is number of 
vehicle types; Qki is yearly travel rate of all type i vehicles passing through tunnel 
section k (veh·km/ year); i  is average number of travelers using vehicle type i vehicle; 
jkF  is the yearly frequency of accident scenario j occurred at tunnel section k; jkN  is 
number of fatalities when scenario j occurred at tunnel section k ; kJ is the total 
number of accident scenarios that could be occurred at tunnel section k. 
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 In this study, the simple societal risk defined by eqn. (2.2) and EV defined by 
eqn. (2.4) are applied. In order to measure severity of societal risk, slack clearance 
index is defined as the minimum gap from safety target to the F/N curve, namely,  
 
        log log logmin
i i i
C kS N F NL     (4.2) 
 
where A is the set of the selected values of number of fatalities,  iF N  is the 
cumulative frequency of all the accident scenarios occurred at the road tunnel with iN  
or more fatalities. The index indicates the slack clearance between safety target and 
F/N curve. SL takes non-negative values if the tunnel is considered safe according to 
the predetermined safety target. The less SL is, the riskier the tunnel is in terms of 
societal risk.  
The authorities for road tunnel may require an integrated index to evaluate the 
individual risk and societal risk for the road tunnel as a whole. Therefore, we define 
two types of integrated risk indices for the entire non-homogenous road tunnel after 
obtaining the IR and SR values expressed in the eqns. (4.1) and (2.2) for each 
homogeneous tunnel section. Eqns. (4.3) and (4.5) illustrates the risk in the worst 
section of the tunnel while eqns. (4.4) and (4.6) defines the risk for overall road tunnel 
by weighing the risk indices for each tunnel section. Therefore, two integrated IR risk 

















    (4.4) 




where parameter k  is the weight of tunnel section k . Note that these weights are 
determined by tunnel risk evaluators. For example, the section travel rate 
(veh·km/year) is considered as the weight in Singapore road tunnel risk assessment. In 
reality, the tunnel section length, traffic volume of tunnel section, accident rate of 
tunnel section, etc. can also be considered as the weight. Similarly, two integrated 
societal risk indices can be equally defined below.  
 
     
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
     (4.6) 
 
Eqns. (4.3) and (4.5) represent a pessimistic principle from the viewpoint of 
tunnel designers, who adopted the risk of the worst section in the road tunnel. This 
principle is attractive to those who wish to guard against the “worst case” at least for 
contingency planning. Evidently, tunnel designers are more concerned about the high 
consequence events (worst case). Eqns. (4.4) and (4.6) express a mean value principle 
from the standpoint of tunnel managers, which defines the risk for overall road tunnel 
by weighing the risk indices for each tunnel section. Tunnel managers focus on 
minimizing the total fatalities of the road tunnel. These two principles are widely used 
in game theory and statistics (Howe et al., 1996; Johnson and Chess, 2003). 
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4.3 QRA Model for a Particular Tunnel Section  
Given a particular homogeneous tunnel section k  of a non-homogeneous urban 
road tunnel, its QRA model is built according to the following procedures. Firstly, the 
top event, i.e. fire in road tunnels, is identified based on the expert judgment. 
Subsequently, fault tree and event tree for the top event are built. An event tree 
consists of a number of particular accident scenarios triggered by fire in road tunnels. 
Fault tree is used to estimate the frequency of fire in road tunnels. The frequency of 
each particular accident scenario can be calculated by multiplying the frequency of 
fire in road tunnels and the fractions / probabilities of sequential events (e.g. peak 
hour, fire detection failure, etc.) associated with this scenario. Furthermore, 
consequence estimation models are required to calculate the number of fatalities for 
various accident scenarios involved in an event tree. After obtaining the frequency 
and fatality of each accident scenario, the IR and SR expressed by eqns. (4.1) and (2.2) 
can be calculated.  
 
4.3.1 Event Tree Building  
The top event (fire in road tunnels) may trigger a series of simple events with 
different results (frequencies and consequences). These simple events can be 
represented logically by an event tree. An event tree is simply a tree diagram referring 
to complex events that can be discretized in terms of their distinction by sequential 
events into a series of simple events. Figure 4-2 depicts the event tree starting from 
“Fire in tunnel” and terminating at Fire Fighting Column. Because A4 page cannot 
accommodate the event tree, the tree is decomposed into two sub-event trees, namely, 
sub ET 1 and sub ET 1.1. Sub ET 1.1 continues from all the leaf nodes of sub ET 1. 
There are 240 scenarios (leaf nodes of the tree) in the event tree. Note that the event 
Chapter 4 QRAM-I Modelling  
 
71 
tree is not the same with a conventional event tree representing a sequential logic. 
Column 1, period of day, represents the accident occurred at peak hour (7:00 am to 
9:30 am, 5:00 pm to 8:00 pm), night (9:30 am to 5:00 pm, 8:00 pm to 12:00 am), or 
night (12:00 am to 7:00 am), which is used to determine number of people at risk. 
Column 2, vehicle composition, represents the fire type (e.g. motorcycle fire: Heat 
Release Rate = 1 MW, car fire: Heat Release Rate = 5 MW, bus and HGV fire: Heat 
Release Rate = 50 MW, Hazmat fire: Heat Release Rate = 100 MW), which is an 
important input for fire simulation model. The rest subsequent events are related to 
the tunnel safety provisions working conditions, which affect the delay time (duration 
of people in danger).     




Figure 4-2: Event tree for fire in tunnel top event 
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The frequency of each scenario can be regarded as the product of frequency of  
fire in the tunnel section (estimated by the model proposed in Chapter 3) and 
conditional probabilities/fractions of sequential events (input parameters). The 
conditional probabilities/fractions of sequential events can be calculated by historical 
statistics or instruction manuals of tunnel mitigation facilities (See Appendix A). As 
for the number of fatalities for each scenario, it can be computed by the consequence 
estimation models (Section 4.3.2).  
 
4.3.2 Consequence Estimation Method 
4.3.2.1 Accident response plan in Singapore’s road tunnels  
In the event of a fire accident, traffic downstream of the fire site will be able to 
drive away while traffic upstream of the fire site would be trapped. Prompt detection 
of a fire in the tunnel is an important factor in preventing a catastrophic fire incident. 
According to the conceptual design of the tunnel, two types of fire detection systems, 
i.e. the automatic incident detectors (AID) and linear heat detectors (LHD), are 
provided in the tunnel and the fire detection time is set at 30 to 60 seconds. Closed 
Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) and emergency telephones installed in the tunnel are 
used to verify the occurrence of tunnel fire. The fire verification system would take 
around 60 seconds to respond after receiving the notice from fire detection systems. 
Then, the tunnel will be ventilated in two minutes and the smoke caused by the fire 
will be released to the atmosphere via exhaust stacks in the ventilation buildings. If 
the tunnel ventilation systems fail to work, which would be highly unlikely, the tunnel 
officers will begin to inform and guide the motorists and passengers to evacuate from 
the cross passenger doors. The timeline of the response plan for a fire accident is 
Chapter 4 QRAM-I Modelling  
 
74 
illustrated in Figure 4-3. In Singapore, most motorists and passengers would not 
evacuate from the tunnel bore until they are informed to do so. The timings and 
functional parameters of tunnel safety provisions would be the input parameters for 
consequence estimation models.  
 
 
Figure 4-3: The timeline of incident response plan 
 
4.3.2.2 Estimation of number of people at risk  
The people downstream of cross passage doors could easily evacuate from one 
tunnel bore to the other. Thus, the downstream vehicles of the fire site will not be 
affected by the fire accident and those in upstream will be trapped. Accordingly, the 
area between fire site and the nearest cross passenger door downstream (Figure 4-4) 
should be considered as the risk area. A deterministic queuing model is adopted to 
estimate the people at the area at risk as follows. 





Figure 4-4: The schematic diagram for the queuing model 
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where I  is number of vehicle types (car or truck), iL  is the average length of vehicle 
type i , iP  is the proportion of vehicle type i , H  is distance between two successive 
vehicles when the vehicles stop due to the emergent incidents, and D  is the distance 
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      (4.9) 




where Oi is the average people in vehicle with type i. In this study, we assume that the 
vehicles are located uniformly when they stop due to the emergency incidents in 
urban road tunnels.  
 
4.3.2.3 Fire simulation models  
The estimation of concentrations of toxic gases generated by fire in road tunnels 
has been studied since 1990s (Modic, 2003). In general, the models for estimating the 
concentrations are based on empirical or semi-empirical “hand calculations” using 
spreadsheets or more advanced computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models (Nilsen 
and Log, 2009). For example, Ingason et al. (2001) proposed a hand calculation model 
based on a collocation and further refined the model in spread sheets; Migoya et al. 
(2009) developed a CFD model to simulate the accidental fires in road tunnels. In this 
study, the CFD model is applied and a fire simulation model is built by using the Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) developed by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). The FDS has been widely used for fire simulations (e.g. 
Tsukahara et al., 2011). The process of fire growth and spread could be formulated by 
conservation equations for mass, momentum, energy, and species coupled with the 
equation of state, which are introduced as follows.  




     (4.10) 
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The first term represents the density change with time while u in the second term is 
the velocity vector. This equation describes that the rate of mass storage within the 
control volume due to change in density is balanced by the net rate of inflow.  
The conservation of momentum is written as: 
 
   iju puu p ft
         (4.11) 
 
The equation for conservation of momentum is derived from Newton’s second law of 
motion. This is also known as the Navier Stokes equation which states the sum of 
forces acting on a fluid element is equal to its rate of change of momentum (Cox, 
1995). The first two terms on the left hand side of the equation define the rate of 
change of momentum and terms on the right hand side are the forces acting upon it 
where p represents pressure, ij  is the stress tensor acting on the fluid and f in the 
momentum equation consists of gravity plus other forces such as drag exerted by 
liquid droplets (McGrattan, 2005).  
The conservation of energy is written as: 
   '''h phu q q
t t
          (4.12) 
The energy equation is derived from the first law of thermodynamics where the rate of 
energy change within the control volume is equal to the rate of heat added to the 
control volume minus the rate at which work is done within the control volume 
(Abbott and Basco, 1989). The term on the left hand side is the net rate of energy 
accumulation within the control volume while the terms on the right-hand side 
represent the heat release rate per unit volume from a chemical reaction ( '''q

), the 
conductive and irradiative heat flux ( q ), and the dissipation function ( ), the rate 
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at which kinetic energy is transferred to thermal energy due to the viscosity of the 
fluid (McGrattan, 2005).  
The equation of the state is written as:  
 
 p RT  (4.13) 
 
According to Abbott and Basco (1989), thermodynamics is the study of equilibrium 
states of matter. The state of a given mass of fluid in the control volume in an 
equilibrium state is specified by two parameters (density   and pressure p ). R is gas 
constant (287.05  /J kg K ). T is the temperature (K). 
The conservation of species is written as:  
 
 '''i ii i i
Y Yu D Y m
t
          (4.14) 
 
where fluid consists of a mixture of species, the transport equations for each species 
will need to be solved. The iY  is the mass of the ith species. iD  is the diffusion 
coefficient of species i into the mixture. '''im

 is the production rate of the species i.  
The FDS program works as follows. First, the initial pressure and temperature, 
the tunnel geometry, fire size and location, materials of fuels, the type of fire detection 
systems, the type of ventilation systems, and simulation period are indicated in an 
FDS program. Second, the FDS will numerically solve the equations above and get 
the densities of various toxic gases and temperature of the smoke in different locations 
during the simulation period. Third, the output module could graphically and 
numerically represent the results (densities and temperature).  
Chapter 4 QRAM-I Modelling  
 
79 
The cross sectional layout (tunnel geometry) of a simulated tunnel is presented 
by Figure 4-5. The fire size is determined by vehicle types involved in an accident 
(column 3 in the event tree) as depicted in Figure 4-2. The functional parameters (e.g. 
response time, air velocity of tunnel ventilations, etc.) would be the input parameters 
for the simulation model. The distributions and concentrations of CO, CO2, and O2 
could be estimated by the model. Figure 4-6 presents the distributions of CO of an 
assumed truck fire (50 MW) in a particular time point (t = 19.8s).  
 
 
Figure 4-5: the cross sectional layout of a simulated tunnel 
 
 




Figure 4-6: CO distributions of an assumed tunnel fire 
 
According to the fire simulation model, the concentrations of other toxic gases 
at various locations could be recorded. For example, Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 
present the distributions of CO2 and O2 of an assumed tunnel fire at different time 
point.  
 




Figure 4-7: Concentrations of CO2 (an assumed tunnel fire) 
 
85 m
y: longitudinal distance to fire site




Figure 4-8: Concentrations of O2 (an assumed tunnel fire) 
 
Chapter 4 QRAM-I Modelling  
 
82 
4.3.2.4 Estimation of fatality rate  
The fatality rate at various locations during the time period [0,t] should be 
estimated. Assume the concentrations of various types of gases (CO, CO2, and O2) are 
available for any locations at any time. The additive effects of combustion gases were 
demonstrated in a number of experiments using rodent (Hartzell et al., 1985; Levin et 
al., 1987), which was advanced to include consideration of exposure time. This 
strategy is commonly referred to as the fractional effective dose (FED) methodology. 
The FED is defined as the ratio of the Ct (concentration   time) for a gaseous toxicant 
produced in a given test to that Ct product of the toxicant that has been statistically 
determined from independent experimental data to produce lethality in 50% of test 
animals within a specified exposure and post exposure time (ASTM, 2002; Hartzell, 
2001). 
The additivity of FEDs has become a useful property in fire toxicology for 





1 0 1 0











   
      (4.15) 
 
where ,i tC  is the concentration of toxic component i at time  ; ,iF   is FED caused by 
toxic component i for exposure time [ , ]t    ;  iCt  is the specific dose 
(concentration   time) required to produce lethality; t  is time increment (min) and 
t m t  .  
According to Fire Protection Handbook (2006), carbon dioxide (CO2) is quite 
low in its own toxicological potency and is not, by itself, normally considered as a 
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toxicant in fire atmospheres. However, it does stimulate both the rate and depth of 
breathing, thereby increasing the fatality rate caused by carbon monoxide (CO). Levin 
et al. (1987) developed an empirical FED function for exposure of 30 minutes caused 





& ( , ,30) COCO CO CO CO
CO
m XF X X
X b
   (4.16) 
 
where COX  is the concentration of carbon monoxide (in ppm); 2COX  is the 
concentration of carbon dioxide (in volume percent); m and b are two coefficients: if  
the concentration of carbon dioxide is less than 5%, 18 and 122,000;m b    
otherwise, 23 and 38,600m b   . The confirmatory work using this model has been 
published by Pauluhn (1993).  
Due to the additivity of FEDs, the FED function for exposure time period of [0,t] 
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According to Persson (2002), the FED with respect to low concentration of O2 
for exposure time period of [0,t] is  
 
 





  (4.18) 
 





X  is the concentration of oxygen (in volume percent).  
By substituting eqns. (4.12) and (4.13) to eqn. (4.10), the FED of the mixed 
effects by CO, CO2, and O2 is obtainable. Due to the additivity of FEDs, the fatality 
rate for exposure time period of [0,t] at location m could be estimated by  
 
    2 2 2 2 2 2&, , , ( , , ) ( , ) 50%m CO CO O CO CO CO CO O OF X X X t F X X t F X t   (4.19) 
 
4.3.2.5 Validation of the consequence estimation model due to tunnel fire   
Validation of consequence models is difficult as the fire is a rare event and 
relevant data are not obtainable. In order to complete a validation study, we request 
the data - vehicle composition, distance between two consecutive exits, traffic volume, 
delay time for response, and tunnel configurations of Mont Blanc, Burnley, and 
Tauren road tunnels. Some other input parameters of the model, such as the ratio of 
different age group of Italy and French in the case study for Mont Blanc tunnel fire, 
can be obtained from internet search. The key input parameters are as follows shown 
in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1: Input parameters for simulating Mont Blanc, Burnley, and Tauern road 
tunnel fire incidents 
Input Parameters Mont Blanc Burnley Tauern 
Car Proportion 0.385 0.79 0.76 
Bus Proportion 0 0.02 0.02 
Motorcycle Proportion 0.038 0 0 
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HGV Proportion 0.577 0.19 0.22 










Average Length-Bus 20m 20m 20m 
Average Length-Car 3.5m 3.5m 3.5m 
Average Length-Motorcycle 2m 2m 2m 
Average Length-HGV 20m 20m 20m 
Average Length-Hazmat 20m 20m 20m 
Average Persons Per Bus 35 20 20 
Average Persons Per Car 2.5 3 3 
Average Persons Per Motorcycle 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Average Persons Per HGV 1.8 1 1 
Average Persons Per Hazmat 2 1 1 
Delay Time for Response to 
Accidents 
10 min 1min 1min 
Wind Velocity in Tunnel 6 m/s 4m/s 4m/s 
Number of Lanes 1 3 2 
 
The vehicle composition, traffic volume, and distance between two consecutive 
exits are used to estimate the number of people at risk. The delay time, wind velocity, 
and tunnel ventilation status (Mont Blanc tunnel: failure; the other two tunnels: 
success) are used to estimate the fatality rate. The comparison between historical 
record of death and number of fatalities generated by the model is shown in Table 4-2.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to rebuild real-case fire 
incidents for validation to some extent. Three cases are obviously not convincing to 
conclude that the consequence model performs well. However, due to data 
unavailability and such cases are really limited, we leave the further validation of the 
model as future studies.  
 
Table 4-2: Comparison between number of fatalities generated by the proposed model 
and number of death of actual record 
 Number of fatalities 
generated by the proposed 
model 
Number of death of 
actual record 
Mont Blanc road tunnel 
disaster 
31.79 37 
Burnley road tunnel disaster 2.76 3 
Tauern road tunnel disaster 0.72 1 
 
 
4.3.3 Aggregated QRA Model for Non-homogeneous Urban Road Tunnels  
Having established the QRA model for homogenous road tunnel section, an 
aggregated QRA model for the non-homogeneous urban road tunnels can be 
developed. Figure 4-9 shows the customized framework for building the aggregated 
QRA model. Firstly, according to the proposed tunnel segmentation principle, a non-
homogeneous road tunnel is segmented into a number of homogeneous sections, 
where all the parameters involved in risk calculations can be assumed to be constant. 
The QRA models for the various road tunnel sections are built separately and the IR 
and SR for each tunnel section are calculated independently. Subsequently, the 
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integrated risk indices shown in eqns. (4.3) -  (4.6) can be evaluated for the entire road 
tunnel. Table 4-3 shows the merits and explanations of the aggregated QRA model. 
The model is further computerized as a software tool to facilitate tunnel operators in 
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-- To calculate IR and SR for whole tunnel
Safety Evaluation 
--Criteria for safety evaluation
 
Figure 4-9: The QRA model for non-homogeneous road tunnels building procedure 
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Table 4-3: The differences of the new QRA model 
Model Differences of the model  
Risk assessment method 
QRA model incorporating more scenarios is more 
realistic; the revised definition of IR is more 
appropriate for tunnel risk assessment. 
Input parameters 
Consider more specific input parameters than 
previous developed models: tunnel configurations; 
traffic volume and vehicle composition; human and 
vehicle factors; tunnel safety provisions, etc. 
Model building structure 
Segment-based risk assessment is employed: the 
tunnel is divided into several segments, and the 
overall risk can be the combination of segment-based 
risks 
Frequency estimation and 
consequences estimation 
Event tree and fault tree particularly designed for 
Singapore is used; a model is built to estimate the 
frequency of vehicle crashes; fire simulation based 
consequence estimation model. 
 
4.4 Applications 
 Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) is built to serve the projected increase in 
traffic volume due to the large number of developments in the Marina Bay area, 
Singapore. As is shown in Figure 4-9, it also serves as a vital transport link from 
Marina Bay to other parts of the island. MCE will be the tenth expressway, which is 
the key element of the strategic island-wide road network to support the long-term 
growth of Singapore. It is a dual five-lane, 5km long expressway with 3.8km of it 
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built underground. It will run through segments of reclaimed land as well as a 420m 
section that runs below the seabed of Marina Bay. The functionality and working 
profiles of the tunnel safety provisions can be obtained from their instruction manuals. 
The values of the vehicle profiles can be obtained from the planning department of 
LTA of Singapore. The distance between two emergency exits is 100 meters. The 
safety target of (10-3/ N2) is applied in this case study.  
 
 
Figure 4-10: MCE road tunnel in Singapore 
 
By adopting the tunnel segmentation principle, MCE can be divided into 16 
sections, 7 sections of which are on the eastbound and 9 sections on the westbound 
tunnel. On the eastbound tunnel, there are 2 tunnel slip road sections, 2 tunnel 
intersection sections and 3 main tunnel sections are considered. As for the westbound 
tunnel, there are 3 tunnel slip road sections, 3 tunnel intersection sections and 3 main 
tunnel sections.  
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The geometry figure of the segmented MCE tunnel is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Geometry of MCE tunnel segmentation 
Note that the parameters are different for various tunnel sections. The number of 
lanes, frequencies of fire in the section, and ventilation response time used in this 
study are presented in Table 4-4. The MCE road tunnel is not open to traffic yet. 
Therefore, we use the planning data provided by LTA to conduct this numerical 
example. The traffic volumes in normal periods and night periods are assumed to be 
60% and 20% of that in peak hours. The other parameters, which take the same values 
for different tunnel sections, are presented in Table 4-5.  
 
Table 4-4: Some important input parameters  
  
Section No. Number 
of lanes 
Traffic volume 
in peak hour 
(planning data) 




1 5 1500 0.122128 105 s  
2 5 1500 0.082128 105 s  
3 5 1900 0.279982 105 s  
4 2 400 0.008586 225 s 
5 5 1900 0.279982 105 s  
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6 5 1600 0.149594 105 s  
7 2 300 0.017586 225 s  
8 2 350 0.008586 225 s 
9 5 1550 0.10266 105 s  
10 5 1550 0.10266 105 s  
11 5 1250 0.170729 105 s  
12 2 300 0.007466 225 s  
13 5 1250 0.059729 105 s  
14 5 1600 0.141993 105 s  
15 2 350 0.007466 225 s 
16 5 1600 0.132662 105 s 
 
Table 4-5: Input parameters (the same for distinct tunnel sections) 
Input Parameters  Values 
Fraction of Peak Hour 0.23 
Fraction of Normal Period 0.52 
Fraction of Night Period 0.25 
Car Proportion  0.644 
Bus Proportion  0.021 
Heavy Goods Vehicle Proportion 0.164 
Hazardous Materials Vehicle Proportion  0 
Motorcycle Proportion 0.171 
Distance Between Two Consecutive Exits 100m 
Proportion of the Elderly Tunnel Users  0.3 
Proportion of the Young Tunnel Users 0.7 
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Average Length-Bus 20m 
Average Length-Car 3.5m 
Average Length-Motorcycle 2m 
Average Length-HGV 20m 
Average Length-Hazmat 20m 
Average Persons Per Bus 30 
Average Persons Per Car 2 
Average Persons Per Motorcycle 1.2 
Average Persons Per HGV 1 
Average Persons Per Hazmat 1 
Fraction of Experienced Driver 0.98 
Fraction of Inexperienced Driver 0.02 
Air Velocity (Tunnel Ventilation Success) 1.2 m/s 
Air Velocity (Tunnel Ventilation Failure) 4.5 m/s 
Length of the tunnel  8 km 
Delay time of fire detection system (success) 1 min 
Delay time of fire detection system (failure) 2 min 
Delay time of communication system (success) 0.8 min 
Delay time of communication system (failure) 1.5 min 
 
A QRA software tool (Appendix C) is developed to facilitate this study. Figure 
4-11 to Figure 4-14 shows the expected value of number of fatalities per year, the 
individual risk, and societal risk represented by F/N curve. Figure 4-11 is the 
calculation results by QRA model for non-homogeneous road tunnels proposed in this 
paper. Figure 4-13 depicts the results if the MCE road is regarded as one tunnel 
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section. Figure 4-14 shows the result of the section with the highest risk in terms of 
societal risk. 



















Figure 4-12: Risks of MCE road tunnel by the non-homogeneous QRA model 
 
 





















Figure 4-13: Risks of MCE road tunnel by the homogeneous QRA model 
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Figure 4-14: Risks of the riskiest tunnel sections  
 
As shown in Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-13, both the individual risk and societal 
risk generated by the two models are different, which is reflected by the frequency 
intercept of the F/N curve and the value of individual risk. It draws the conclusion that 
QRAM-I for non-homogeneous road tunnels such as MCE road tunnel is necessary. 
Ellipses A and B display the first point of the F/N curves shown in Figure 4-12 and 
Figure 4-13, respectively. The corresponding frequencies for the two points are 
41.41 10 /yr and 41.01 10 /yr respectively. This means the frequencies of lower 
consequence events may significantly vary with respect to different tunnel 
segmentations. QRA model for non-homogeneous road tunnel can further generate the 
risks of individual section. Hence, the most risky sections can be identified. This is 
very important for tunnel manager to decide risk reduction strategy. 
From the results, we found that tunnel sections 1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16 have 
higher tunnel risks in terms of individual risk (individual risks are greater than 
96 10 ). All the tunnel sections are considered safe according to the test safety target. 
Tunnel sections 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16 have smaller slack clearances (less than 0.2) 
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which indicate that they are riskier in terms of societal risk. Compared to other tunnel 
sections, the above-mentioned sections have higher traffic volume and frequencies of 
collisions. In reality, the traffic volumes of eastbound are indeed less than that of 
westbound from the planning data. This is because more traffic transits from the East 
Coast Expressway, one of the busiest expressways in Singapore, to MCE road tunnel. 
In addition, there are limited tunnel mitigation facilities in slip roads. These may also 
result in higher risks in slip road tunnel section. However, the total travel rates 
(weights for risk integration) of tunnel section 7, 8 (slip roads), 6, 11, 14 (tunnel 
intersection), and section 1 (short main tunnel) are much smaller than those of tunnel 
section 10 and 16 (long main road tunnel). Therefore, tunnel section 10 (41,686,921 
veh·km/year) and section 16 (12,161,137 veh·km/year) contribute most to the overall 
road tunnel risk.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, a deterministic QRA model (QRAM-I) for non-homogeneous 
urban road tunnels is developed. In the proposed model, a non-homogeneous urban 
road tunnel is segmented into a number of homogeneous road tunnel sections based 
on the proposed tunnel segmentation principle. For each particular tunnel section, the 
frequency could be estimated by using the model proposed in Chapter 3; fire 
simulation model and fractional effective dose (FED) methodology are applied to 
estimate the number of fatalities under different accidental scenarios by taking into 
account the different working status of tunnel safety provisions. Having had the 
frequency and consequence of each possible accidental scenario for the homogeneous 
tunnel section, the individual risk and societal risk of the tunnel section can be 
calculated accordingly. Finally, an aggregated QRA model is thus built by integrating 
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the section-based QRA models. The model is further computerized as software to 
facilitate tunnel operators to evaluate risks in urban road tunnels (Appendix C). The 
model and software has been applied by Land Transport Authority of Singapore to 
assess the risks of urban road tunnels in the country.  




CHAPTER 5 RISK IMPACT ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC FLOW  
 
5.1 Risk Index and Risk Control/Management Strategies   
Road tunnels are vital infrastructures providing underground vehicular 
passageways for commuters and motorists. They contribute to transportation systems, 
both economically and practically, because they enhance capacity and accessibility. 
However, fatal accidents occurring in road tunnels may result in catastrophic 
consequences. According to The Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety, the consequences 
of tunnel incidents may include: (1) fatality, (2) injury, (3) property loss, and (4) 
disruption of operations, with the number of fatalities being the predominant concern 
of Land Transport Authority of Singapore. In addition, all the preventive and/or 
protective safety provisions (e.g. fire detection systems, tunnel ventilation systems) 
installed in a road tunnel aims specifically to reduce number of fatalities. Accordingly, 
from the perspective of land transport authorities, societal risk is usually used to 
evaluate the safety level of a road tunnel. Most countries have chosen an upper bound 
for societal risk as a safety target for their road tunnels (Meng et al., 2009; PIARC, 
2008). If the societal risk generated by a QRA model is below the chosen safety target, 
the road tunnel is considered safe. Otherwise, risk reduction measures need to be 
implemented.  
Under the QRA model, the risk of a given road tunnel is determined by its 
geometries, traffic volume, vehicle composition, hazmat transportation, E&M systems, 
the distance between evacuation exits, and other parameters. The tunnel geometries 
and safety provisions are designed at the planning stage. Once the tunnel is open to 
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traffic, these parameters are considered to be un-adjustable - it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to adjust these parameters to reduce the risks. By contrast, critical 
components of traffic flow can be controlled conveniently through the use of entry 
controls and traffic regulations. Total traffic flow has an important bearing on societal 
risk because as the traffic volume in a road tunnel increases there tends to be an 
increase both in the frequency of accidents and in the number of injuries and fatalities 
in any given accident (Davis, 2000; Abdel-Aty and Pande, 2007). The number of 
Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) in proportion to total traffic is an important factor 
within this general pattern, both because HGVs as such increase the risk of accident, 
and because an accident involving an HGV tends to be more severe in terms of 
fatalities than one involving only smaller vehicles. These elements are recognized in 
Singapore, where prior notice must be given to the Land Transport Authority (LTA) 
for approval before an HGV can enter a road tunnel (thus the proportion of HGV is a 
controllable parameter in Singapore), and overall traffic flow through the tunnel can 
be controlled using the normal signalling system.. 
The traffic volume and proportion of HGVs are two important contributing 
factors to the risks of road tunnels. It is thus important to capture a picture of how 
these two factors affect societal risk. Towards this end, a risk impact analysis 
approach is proposed, not only to support the design considerations of new tunnels by 
varying these two factors (planning data), but also to evaluate various road tunnel 
traffic control schemes and HGV transport regulations, which may provide helpful 
information to decision makers. In addition, given a combination of the traffic volume 
and the proportion of HGVs, the F/N curve generated by a QRA model may not fulfill 
a predetermined road tunnel safety target. In this case, we need an index to measure 
how far the risk is from the safety target. Accordingly, the “excess risk index” is 
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defined to quantify the danger levels of road tunnels relative to the safety target. 
Based on this index, a contour chart is plotted, incorporating possible combinations of 
the two contributing factors. This chart could further facilitate LTA’s decision making.  
 
5.2 Risk Impact Analysis Methodology   
In this section, we first propose an excess risk index in order to quantify the 
magnitude of risk for road tunnels which do not meet safety targets. Based on the 
proposed index, an excess risk-based risk impact analysis is presented, to examine 
how the traffic flow parameters influence risks. 
 
5.2.1 Excess Risk Index 
Societal risk, represented by an F/N curve, reflects the risks of hazardous 
installations. It is convenient for decision makers to recognize whether societal risk of 
a road tunnel passes a predetermined safety target. However, it can only provide a 
binary judgment and cannot reflect the degree of danger quantitatively in terms of the 
risks of hazardous installations. Horn et al. (2008) proposed a measure defined as the 
total extent to which the constraint is violated, expressed by 
 
     
1
( ) ( )
M
n
F n C n
v F n C n

   (5.1) 
 
where M is the upper limit on the number of fatalities per incident; C(n) is the risk 
limit (safety target). Following Horn et al.’s work, another risk index, excess risk 
index, is defined as weighted summation of distances between the predetermined 
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safety target and F/N points which are above the safety target. Let us take an example 
to intuitively illustrate the excess risk index. Figure 5-1 depicts an F/N curve diagram 
generated by QRAM-I software tool. The diamonds on the F/N curve are generated by 
the software in the case that traffic volume is 1800 vehs/hour·lane. The asterisks on 
the F/N curve are generated when traffic volume is 1600 vehs/hour·lane. As per the 
safety target shown by the straight line in Figure 5-1, both scenarios are unacceptable 
since both curves have some points higher than the safety target. However, the F/N 
curve with diamonds is much more dangerous than the asterisks curve (all diamonds 
are significantly higher than asterisks, e.g.    4 51800 16003 1.5 10 3 8.8 10F F      ). 
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where Se is the excess risk index; Ni is the selected value of number of fatalities; n is 
the number of fatalities, C and k are two constants representing the intercept and slope 
of the safety target. For an acceptable F/N curve, Se takes the value of 0. As shown in 
Figure 5-1, with increasing numbers of fatalities the F(N) curve is shifted to the right, 
while with increasing frequency it is shifted upwards, and wherever F(N) surpasses 
the target curve the exceeding risk value becomes non-zero. In reality, excess risk 
basically refers to the area of any regions where F(N) lies above the predetermined 
safety target.  
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Figure 5-1: An F/N curve example 
 
5.2.2 Excess Risk Index-Based Risk Impact Analysis  
 A risk impact analysis of the two contributing factors, traffic volume and 
proportion of HGVs, to the societal risk of a road tunnel can be implemented easily 
using the QRAM-I software tool. The F/N curve can be generated using the tool on a 
case by case basis. The risk impact analysis procedure works as follows. Firstly, 
determine the ranges of traffic volume (Xi) and proportion of HGVs (Yj) and discretize 
these ranges. The range of traffic volume may be assumed to be between 1,000 and 
1,800 vehs/hour·lane, based on historical data, and the step is taken to be 200 
vehs/hour·lane, based on expert judgment. The examined traffic volumes are thus 
taken to be 1,000, 1,200, 1,400, 1,600, and 1,800 vehs/hour·lane. The values of the 
other input parameters required in the QRAM-I (as described in Chapter 4) can be 
acquired from historical data and the design documents of the road tunnels. These 
values are held constant in this risk impact analysis.  
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 Next, a quantitative risk analysis is performed for all possible combinations of 
the two major contributing factors (traffic volume and proportion of HGVs). The 
societal risk for all combinations is generated using the QRAM-I software tool and the 
excess risk (Re) can thus be calculated using Equation (5.2). Excess risk can thus be 
considered as the output of the various combinations of the two contributing factors. 
 Finally, an excess risk contour chart is introduced to illustrate the changing 
pattern of excess risk. We plot points (combinations of the two contributing factors) 
which produce the same excess risk, that is, for a given value of excess risk  , we 
plot the points (Xi, Yj) where ( , )e i jR X Y   . Then, the B-spline curve fitting method, a 
process of constructing a smooth curve with the best fit to a series of data points, is 
adopted to generate a smooth contour line. Finally, the excess risk contour chart is 
drawn using these curve fitting methods for varying values of  . Figure 5-2 
illustrates the two-factor impact analysis procedure. 




Figure 5-2: Two-factor sensitivity analysis procedure 
 
It should be pointed out that this method and the proposed index could also be 
applied to analyze the impact of other input parameters, and could also be generalized 
to analyze three or more parameters as well.  
 
5.3 Applications to KPE road tunnels in Singapore  
We have applied this methodology in conjunction with LTA of Singapore to 
evaluate the effect of the two above-mentioned important contributing factors: traffic 
volume and the proportion of HGVs. Thereby, the traffic capacity and acceptable 
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proportion of HGVs in terms of risk in the three existing non-homogeneous urban 
road tunnels in Singapore have been derived.  
The Kallang/Paya Lebar Expressway (KPE) in Singapore, shown in Figure 5-3, 
has a total length of twelve kilometres, and is 36 meters wide. Nine kilometres of the 
expressway is built underground as a road tunnel, serving the growing traffic demands 
of the north-eastern sector of Singapore. It is the longest road tunnel in South East 
Asia. The KPE road tunnel is a dual three-lane underground passageway and has nine 
entry slip roads, eight exit slip roads and six longitudinal ventilation buildings. The 
cross-sectional area of the tunnel is around 306 meters squared. The distance between 
emergency exits is one hundred meters. There is a twenty-four hour manned operation 
control centre (OCC) in one of the ventilation buildings and an unmanned hot standby 
OCC located in another ventilation building. The major safety provisions of the KPE 
tunnel include a tunnel ventilation and environmental control system, a fire protection 
system, an electrical system, an integrated traffic and plant management system and a 
communications system.  
 
Figure 5-3: KPE road tunnels in Singapore 




5.3.1 Traffic Volume Impact Analyses  
In order to quantify the impact on societal risk of the road tunnel’s traffic 
volume, measured as total number of vehicles at peak hour, an impact analysis is 
performed. All the other input parameters (default values) are based on operational 
data collected from Singapore’s KPE road tunnel. As mentioned earlier, the traffic 
volume varies from 1,000 to 1,800 vehs/hour·lane. The F/N curves associated with 
different traffic volumes are shown in Figure 5-4. A safety target of 10-3 / N2 is 
adopted in this case study.  
Figure 5-4(a) depicts the F/N curves for traffic volumes varying from 1,000 to 
1,400 vehs/hour·lane. In these three scenarios, the KPE tunnel can be considered safe 
based on the chosen safety target. Figure 5-4(b) shows the F/N curves for traffic 
volumes of 1,600 and 1,800 vehs/hour·lane. It can be seen that these two scenarios are 
not acceptable based on the selected safety target. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the maximum tolerable traffic volume of the KPE road tunnel is 1,400 vehs/hour·lane.  
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Figure 5-4: Two F/N curve diagrams for the KPE road tunnel 
 
5.3.2 Impact Analyses on the Proportion of HGVs 
As mentioned in the introductory section, according to the Road Traffic Act of 
Singapore, a form of notice is required to be submitted to the LTA of Singapore 
before an HGV enters the KPE road tunnel. According to the impact analysis, the 
maximum proportion of HGVs is obtainable, which can be used to support the LTA’s 
decisions regarding how many HGVs it allows to enter the tunnel. The proportion of 
HGVs ranges from 5 to 30%. Meanwhile, the traffic volume takes values of between 
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1,200 and 1,800 vehs/hour·lane. Figure 5-5 represents the F/N curves for scenarios 
with traffic volumes of 1,200, 1,400, 1,600, and 1,800 vehs/hour·lane for varying 
proportions of HGVs. Figure 5-5(a) shows that if the traffic volume is relatively low, 
even with a 30% proportion of HGVs, the F/N curve stays below the safety target. 
However, at 1,400 vehs/hour·lane (which is likely, due to the densely populated 
nature of Singapore), even 15% HGVs could impose a significant threat to the 
tunnel’s users, since some of the F/N points exceed the safety target (Figure 5-5(b)). 
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Figure 5-5: Four F/N curve diagrams of the KPE road tunnel




5.3.3 Excess Risk Index Contour Chart  
The above impact analysis indicates that traffic volume and the proportion of 
HGVs have a significant impact on the tunnel risk. Therefore, both parameters should 
be taken into consideration in the impact analysis. For each combination of these two 
parameters, the excess risk index is calculated using the QRAM-I. The excess risk 
index-based contour chart is drawn by varying the traffic volume from 1,000 to 1,800 
vehs/hour/lane in steps of 200 and the proportion of HGVs from 5% to 30% in steps 
of 5%. After obtaining the excess risk value for all thirty possible combinations of the 
two variables, the risk contour chart is drawn using the curve fitting method (as 
described earlier). The contour chart is shown in Figure 5-6. Region 1 is considered to 
be the safe region. The excess risk index will become bigger as the traffic volume and 
proportion of HGVs increase. This contour chart can assist decision-makers in 
deciding on the most appropriate combination of traffic volume and proportion of 
HGVs for any given safety target.  
As the population of Singapore increases, more road tunnels will be built due to 
the need for more efficient land use. Furthermore, the proportion of HGVs passing 
along Singapore’s expressways is relatively high, due to the need to transport 
containers to and from the port of Singapore, the busiest container port in the world. It 
is thus important to determine the most suitable combinations of the two most 
important contributing factors to societal risk. Considering the urban nature of 
Singaporean road tunnels, traffic volume tends to be at the higher end of the range 
that we have considered in our impact analysis. This means that the road tunnels may 
be operating near to the risk contour line 0, which shows the maximum allowable 
traffic volume based on the selected safety target. If the traffic volume or the 




proportion of HGVs increases, then the risk index may increase beyond the risk 
contour line 0, which will no longer satisfy the safety target. If effective operational 
procedures are implemented, this would help to reduce the transportation of HGVs 
through road tunnels, then this would effectively shift the excess risk index from risk 
contour line 10-5 to risk contour line 0 and thus the chosen safety target would still be 
satisfied. For example, if the tunnel were operating with 1,200 vehs/hour/lane and 
20% HGVs (Point A in Figure 5-6), the operational status would be unsafe and risk 
reduction solutions would need to be implemented. Based on Figure 5-6, the LTA 
could either reduce the traffic volume from 1,200 to 1,117 vehs/hour/lane or reduce 
the proportion of HGVs from 20% to 17%. Based on this contour chart, therefore, the 
LTA can examine the operational status of a tunnel and implement suitable risk 
reduction solutions.  
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Figure 5-6: Risk contour chart based on the excess risk index 
 




5.4 Implications for Tunnel Management  
Risk impact analysis is of great significance for tunnel management. The tunnel 
risk is dependent on traffic flow (traffic volume and the proportion of HGV vehicles). 
If a tunnel operates with an unsafe status, tunnel authorities may either reduce the 
traffic volume or the proportion of HGV vehicles passing through the tunnel. For 
example, three operational procedures have been considered to reduce tunnel risks in 
Singapore. Firstly, as presented in the introductory section, in Singapore, a form of 
notice is required to be submitted to the LTA for approval before an HGV can enter a 
road tunnel, in accordance with the Road Traffic Act. Accordingly, the LTA can insist 
that HGVs pass through road tunnels only during off-peak hours when traffic volumes 
are lower. Secondly, a tunnel entry control could be used in the entrance of the road 
tunnel during peak times, to ensure a safe distance of more than one hundred meters, 
or at least the braking distance based on the speed limit of the road tunnel. Thirdly, 
electronic road pricing (ERP) and ramp metering could be used to limit the traffic 
flow. The risk index contour chart could be used to examine the efficiency of a road 
pricing strategy from the viewpoint of risk reduction.  
 
5.5 Conclusions   
This chapter has developed a QRAM-I model based risk impact analysis 
methodology to evaluate the impact of contributing factors on societal risk. In 
addition, an “excess risk index” has been defined to quantify the severities of 
unacceptable scenarios which place road tunnel operations above a predetermined 
safety target. A contour chart, based on the excess risk index, could be plotted using 
all possible combinations of two different parameters. The contour chart can be used 




to help decision makers to implement suitable risk reduction solutions so as to better 
manage/control the risks in urban road tunnels. Finally, the QRAM-I was used to 
generate the F/N curves (societal risk) and the values of the excess risk index for the 
KPE road tunnel in Singapore. The risk impact analysis shows that the maximum 
tolerable traffic volume is 1,200 vehs/hour·lane and the maximum acceptable 
proportion of HGVs is 15% of the total traffic volume, which suggests the current 
operational status of KPE road tunnels is within the safety targets.  





CHAPTER 6  QRA MODEL WITH PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY FOR A 
ROAD TUNNEL SECTION  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The individual risk (IR) and societal risk (SR) for road tunnels could be 
obtainable the QRAM-I (Chapter 4). IR is a crisp value which refers to the risk to an 
individual tunnel commuter or motorist and SR is represented graphically in the form 
of frequency/number of fatalities (F/N) curve which is considered as an index to 
measure the safety level of a road tunnel. The risk assessment of a road tunnel is 
determined by a variety of input parameters such as tunnel geometries, traffic volume, 
vehicle composition, hazmat transport, tunnel safety provisions, distance between two 
evacuation exits, etc. It is universally acknowledged that uncertainty is an unavoidable 
component in risk analysis (Baraldi and Zio, 2008; Lemming et al., 2010; Baudrit et 
al., 2006). There are two distinct kinds of uncertainty affecting parameters (Ferson 
and Ginzburg, 1996; Hoffman and Hammonds, 1994). The first kind refers to 
randomness resulting from inherent variability, e.g. the failure probability of the 
hardware-failure-dominated (HFD) events (Huang et al., 2001). The other kind of 
uncertainty, i.e. imprecision due to lack of information, results from systematic 
measurement errors or expert opinions (Möller et al., 1999). Both types of uncertainty 
are very common in risk assessment for fire in road tunnels. For example, most tunnel 
E&M systems (e.g. fire detection systems, tunnel ventilation systems, etc.), which are 
HFD systems, are implemented to reduce the threats from fire in tunnels; in addition, 
there are few fire accident records according to historical data (imprecision due to 




lack of information). In fact, the tunnel operators may want to look into a particular 
tunnel section (they concerned) to obtain more information about the risks (e.g. lower 
and upper bounds, percentile based values, etc.), rather than a crisp value IR and a 
figure SR, by taking into account the parameter uncertainty . 
As suggested by Ferson and Ginzburg (1996), distinct representation models are 
needed to adequately account for random variability (also referred to as aleatory 
uncertainty) and imprecision (also referred to as epistemic uncertainty). However, in 
the aforementioned QRA models for fire in road tunnels, parameters with both types 
of uncertainty are represented by crisp values (worst case or most probable values) 
without considering inherent random uncertainty and/or imprecision of parameters 
due to lack of information, which is unrealistic and could result in erroneous and 
unreliable assessment. Therefore, suitable approaches should be applied to represent 
the input parameters in a QRA model.  
In this chapter, distinct approaches are applied to represent and propagate 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in a QRA model for fire in road tunnels. Ferson 
and Ginzburg (1996) argued that the two types of uncertainty should be propagated 
through mathematical expressions with different calculation methods, i.e. interval 
analysis based on fuzzy set theory could be used to propagate imprecision and 
probability theory could be applied in propagating variability. In 2006, Baudrit et al. 
proposed a pioneering hybrid study based on the evidence theory to combine the 
propagation process of aleatory uncertainty represented by probabilistic random 
variables and epistemic uncertainty represented by fuzzy numbers. Similarly, Baraldi 
and Zio (2008) presented an approach applying a combined Monte Carlo and 
possibilistic approach to propagate parameter uncertainty in event tree analysis. The 
frequencies of various scenarios (outputs of the uncertainty propagation procedure) 




are considered as a set of fuzzy numbers in the above-mentioned approaches. 
However, as mentioned by Baudrit et al. (2006), the hybrid propagation scheme 
presented in their paper does not so much account for dependence among probabilistic 
parameters or possibilistic variables. The similar assumption of independence is also 
made by Baraldi and Zio (2008). In addition, the above-mentioned models aim to 
address the uncertainty in event tree analysis, which is only one component to 
estimate frequency in a QRA model. In reality, parameter uncertainty is involved in 
not only event tree analysis but also consequence estimation models, which is the 
other component of calculating the consequences of scenarios in a QRA model. 
Therefore, both the frequency and number of fatalities (consequence) of a scenario 
should be considered as a set of fuzzy numbers based on the approach. Accordingly, 
the IR (combination of frequencies and consequences) generated by a QRA model 
with parameter uncertainty may no longer be a crisp number and the SR calculated by 
the model could not be represented by a single F/N curve. Consequently, new 
approaches should be proposed to estimate the IR and SR in order to support tunnel 
risk evaluators.  
On the basis of the QRAM-I, this chapter proposes a further study on developing 
a QRA model for fire in a road tunnel section which takes into consideration the two 
types of uncertainty. In this model, all the input parameters are categorized into three 
types: constants, parameters with aleatory uncertainty, and parameters with epistemic 
uncertainty. The two types of uncertainty are formulated by probability distribution 
functions and fuzzy numbers. Accordingly, a Monte Carlo based estimation approach 
is applied to propagate parameter uncertainty in QRA models including not only event 
tree analysis but also consequence estimation models. The dependencies or 
interrelations among parameters with epistemic uncertainty are taken into account by 




using optimization models based on extension principle of fuzzy set theory. Based on 
definitions of individual risk and societal risk, percentile-based individual risks and 
 -cut-based societal risks are proposed and the risk indices provide a whole picture 
of risks to assess the safety level of a road tunnel. 
The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows. Firstly, a QRA 
model for a road tunnel section with parameter uncertainty (QRAM-II) is proposed 
and a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation based estimation procedure is applied to 
calculate the frequencies and consequences of various scenarios. Second, 
interrelations among parameters with epistemic uncertainty are taken into 
consideration in the proposed estimation procedure. Thirdly, different from the 
previous studies, uncertainty propagation for not only event tree analysis but also 
consequences estimation model are addressed in this study. Fourthly, percentile-based 
individual risks and  -cut-based societal risks are initially proposed to support 
decision makers with distinct risk attitudes. Lastly, a case study utilizing actual data 
collected from Singapore KPE road tunnel is carried out to compare the results 
generated by the previous QRAM-I model and the proposed QRA model for 
demonstrating the necessity of the uncertainty propagation procedure.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, a QRA 
model for a road tunnel section with parameter uncertainty is proposed. Section 3 
presented a Monte Carlo simulation based approach to estimate the frequencies and 
consequences of various accidental scenarios. In Section 4, the percentile-based 
individual risks and  -cut-based societal risks are defined and the application of this 
model to Singapore KPE road tunnel is carried out in Section 5. Conclusions are 
discussed in the last section.  
 




6.2 QRA Model for A Road Tunnel Section with Parameter Uncertainty   
6.2.1 Parameters with Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty  
 Ferson and Ginzburg (1996) recognized two basic types of uncertainty that were 
considered as fundamentally different from each other: aleatory uncertainty and 
epistemic uncertainty. The former arises from variability or randomness due to 
inherent stochasticy or heterogeneity. The latter refers to imprecision due to lack of 
knowledge or information on the system. In the previous QRA models for road 
tunnels, both types of uncertainty are formulated by crisp values (PIARC, 2008; Meng 
et al., 2009). Some researchers began to formulate the aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainty by means of probability distribution functions (Labaieniec et al., 1997; 
Meng et al., 2010). In reality, probabilistic representation of aleatory uncertainty is 
appropriate because sufficiently informative data are usually available for aleatory 
uncertainty with inherent stochasticy (Baraldi and Zio, 2008; Huang et al., 2001). 
However, it may not be appropriate to formulate to formulate epistemic uncertainty by 
using the same representation because sufficiently informative data are often not 
available for statistical analysis to derive a probability distribution function. Indeed, 
an expert may not have sufficiently refined knowledge to characterize the uncertainty 
in terms of probability distributions. The epistemic uncertainty may be more 
adequately captured by fuzzy numbers based on possibility theory (Huang et al., 2001; 
Baudrit et al., 2006)4.  
                                                 
4 According to the review paper by Möller and Beer (2008), subjective uncertainty (or epistemic 
uncertainty used by some other researchers) could be represented by interval, fuzzy numbers, rough 
sets, etc. However, a limitation of the interval modelling is its binary treatment of information – an 
element either belongs to or not belongs to the interval. By contrast, fuzzy set theory is a direct 
generalization and enhancement of the interval method: the intervals could be assessed or weighted 
with the aid of different types of membership functions. Thus fuzzy numbers are more appropriate in 
this study.  




 Input parameters which have relatively less uncertainty are considered as 
constants in a QRA model for fire in road tunnels. These parameters are represented 
by crisp numbers in this study. Peak hour fraction, normal period fraction, night 
period fraction, various vehicles composition, distance between two consecutive exits, 
tunnel user profiles, average lengths of various vehicles, vehicle driver profiles, total 
length of the tunnel, and air velocities are identified as constants in the proposed 
model. The input parameters and their notations are illustrated in Table 6-1.  
 
Table 6-1: Input parameters (constant). 
Input Parameters  Notation Input Parameters  Notation 
Fraction of Peak Hour 1u  Average Length-Motorcycle 14u  
Fraction of Normal Period 2u  Average Length-HGV 15u  
Fraction of Night Period 3u  Average Length-Hazmat 16u  
Car Proportion  4u  Average Persons Per Bus 17u  
Bus Proportion  5u  Average Persons Per Car 18u  
Heavy Goods Vehicle 
Proportion 
6u  Average Persons Per 
Motorcycle 
19u  
Hazardous Materials Vehicle 
Proportion  
7u  Average Persons Per HGV 20u  
Motorcycle Proportion 8u  Average Persons Per Hazmat 21u  
Distance Between Two 
Consecutive Exits 
9u  Fraction of Experienced 
Driver 
22u  
Proportion of the Elderly 10u  Fraction of Inexperienced 23u  




Tunnel Users  Driver 
Proportion of the Young 
Tunnel Users 
11u  Air Velocity (Tunnel 
Ventilation Success) 
24u  
Average Length-Bus 12u  Air Velocity (Tunnel 
Ventilation Failure) 
25u  
Average Length-Car 13u  Length of the tunnel section 26u  
 
There are enough daily traffic data collected by Operation Control Center of 
road tunnels. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use random variables to formulate 
the uncertainty of traffic volume. Based on the collected data, the distribution types 
and parameters can be derived by using statistical methods. The HFD events could be 
formulated by lognormal probability distributions and sufficient experimental data are 
available to derive probability distributions of these events (Huang et al., 2001; 
Baraldi and Zio, 2008). Therefore, the traffic volume and tunnel safety provisions 
failure rate are represented by random variables in this study, which are shown in 
Table 6-2. The likelihoods of tunnel safety provisions success can be calculated 
accordingly.  
 
Table 6-2: Input parameters with aleatory uncertainty.  
Input Parameters  Notation 
Traffic Volume in Peak Hour 1x  
Traffic Volume in Normal Period 2x  
Traffic Volume of Night Period 3x  




Probability of Tunnel Ventilation System Failure   4x  
Probability of Tunnel Detection System Failure   5x  
Probability of Tunnel Communication System Failure   6x  
 
The frequency of fire in road tunnels, the reaction time of drivers, and delay 
time of the systems should be estimated by expert judgments due to limited 
information. The fuzzy input parameters are illustrated in Table 6-3. Note that the 
fuzzy input parameters could be calibrated by using fault tree technique (most 
probable value) and expert judgment (lower and upper bounds).  
 
Table 6-3: Input parameters with epistemic uncertainty. 
Input Parameters  Notation  
Frequency of Fire in Tunnel 1y  
Reaction Time of the Inexperienced Driver 2y  
Reaction Time of the Experienced Driver 3y  
Delay Time when Fire Communication System Failing to work   4y  
Delay Time if Tunnel Communication System Working Normally 5y  
Delay Time when Fire Detection System Failing to Work 6y  
Delay Time when Fire Detection System Working Normally 7y  
  
Consequently, the outputs of the proposed model are determined by a number of 
constants, random variables, and fuzzy numbers. If the distributions of the random 
variables and the membership functions of the fuzzy numbers are available, it is 




possible to calculate the results (consequences and frequencies of various scenarios of 
the event tree) by using probability theory and fuzzy arithmetic principle. However, 
due to the complexity of the QRA model, it is straightforward that the problem does 
not have a closed form. Therefore, a Monte Carlo based approach is proposed to 
estimate the frequency and number of fatalities of each scenario (See Chapter 6.3).  
 
6.2.2 The Dependencies between Uncertain Parameters  
The dependency among parameters with aleatory uncertainty (random variables) 
can be conveniently accounted for with the Monte Carlo technique in this study. 
However, the dependency or interrelations among parameters with epistemic 
uncertainty is not easy to deal with. To date, there is no approach to deal with the 
relationships or dependencies in the QRA framework (Meng et al., 2009; PIARC, 
2008; Baudrit et al., 2006; Baraldi and Zio, 2008). However, dependencies or 
relationships among fuzzy numbers should not be neglected in risk assessment for 
road tunnels. 
The membership functions of fuzzy input parameters are based on expert 
judgments. However, the judgments from various experts may not be consistent and 
this may result in irrational or contradictory results. For example, the membership 
functions with respect to the delay times with different working conditions in 
Singapore KPE road tunnel are shown in Figure 6-1. From the figure, we can see the 
two membership functions have overlaps. In reality, it is improbable that the delay 
time with tunnel E&M systems failure is less than that with success conditions of the 
systems. Similarly, the average reaction time of experienced drivers should be less 
than that of inexperienced drivers. In this regard, interrelations among the fuzzy 




numbers may significantly influence the rationality of the results. Therefore, the 









Figure 6-1: An example of two membership functions. 
 
6.3 A Monte Carlo Simulation Based Estimation Approach  
In this section, a Monte Carlo simulation based approach is proposed to estimate 
the frequencies and numbers of fatalities of various accidental scenarios (leaf nodes of 
the event tree) in a QRA model. The interrelations among input parameters with 
epistemic uncertainty are also addressed in the simulation process.  
 
6.3.1 Propagation Procedure  
The uncertainty propagation process involves two main steps. It combines a 
Monte Carlo technique (random sampling) with the extension principle of fuzzy set 
theory. Let us consider a model which output, consequence or frequency of a 




particular scenario, is a function of  1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , ,I J Kf u u u x x x y y y   . The first 
I input parameters are considered as constants  1 1, , , Iu u u , the following J 
parameters are characterized as parameters with aleatory uncertainty which are 
represented by random variables  1 2, , , JX X X , and the last K parameters are 
considered as parameters with epistemic uncertainty represented by fuzzy numbers 
 1 2, , , KY Y Y . The hybrid uncertainty propagation procedure is summarized as 
follows: 
 
Step 0: Initialize the values for deterministic parameters  1 2, , , Iu u u ; 
Step 1: Generate the rth realization of J random numbers 1 2( , , , )
r r r
Jx x x  from 
the multivariate probability distribution  1 2, , , JX X X  taking into 
account dependencies (if known); 
Step 2: Select a possibility value (0 : :1]  ( is the step size, e.g. 0.05) and 
the corresponding   cuts      1 1 2 2, , , , , ,r r r r r rK Ky y y y y y       of fuzzy 
numbers 1 2, , , KY Y Y ; 
Step 3: Interval calculation: calculate the Inf (or minimum) and Sup (or 
maximum) values of  11 1 222 , , ,, , , , , , , ,r r rI Kr r rJxf u u xu y y yx      , 
considering all values located within the  -cut interval for each fuzzy 
number taking into account the mate-dependency between fuzzy numbers 
(see Section 3.2);  




Step 4: Assign these Inf and Sup values ( rf  and rf  ) to the lower and upper 
bounds of the  -cut of the fuzzy output rf (fuzzy output with respect to 
the rth realization); 
Step 5: Return to step 2 and repeat steps 3 and 4 for another  -cut. The fuzzy 
output  11 1 222 , , ,, , , , , , , ,r r rI Kr r rJxf u u xu y y yx       can be obtained from 
the Inf and Sup values of various  -cuts. Thus the membership function 
of fuzzy output rf  can be derived accordingly; 
Step 6: Return to step 1 to generate a new realization of the random variables. A 
family of fuzzy outputs  1 2, , , Mf f f is obtained, where M is the 
number of realizations for random vector  1 2, , , JX X X . 
Step 7: Calculate possibility measures  1 2, , , Mf f f    and necessity 
measures  1 2, , , Mf f fN N N  for various fuzzy numbers 1 2, , ,f f   and 
Mf . 
Step 8: Combine these M possibility and necessity measures to obtain the 
believe Bel and the plausibility Pl for 
 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , ,I J Kf u u u x x x y y y    according to the following eqns. 













   (6.2) 
 




6.3.2 The Dependency between Parameters with Epistemic uncertainty 
 As mentioned above, the dependency among parameters with epistemic 
uncertainty should not be neglected. In this sub-section, an approach based on 
extension principle is proposed.  
 Let us consider a QRA model  1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , ,r r rI J Kf u u u x x x Y Y Y   , where 
1 2, , , Iu u u  are crisp numbers, 1 2, , ,r r rJx x x  are the rth realization of random vector 
 1 2, , , JX X X , and 1 2, , , KY Y Y are fuzzy numbers with some types of 
interdependencies. In the present study, two types of dependencies are discussed in 
view of the actual condition of risk assessment for road tunnels: equation relationship 
and inequality relationship, e.g. one parameter is consistently greater than another one. 
As mentioned in last section, we use interval calculation (Step 3) to estimate the 
membership function of fuzzy number rf . Assume that the  -cut intervals for 
1 2, , , KY Y Y are intervals      1 1 2 2, , , , , ,K Ky y y y y y      , respectively. Based on the 
definition of extension principle of fuzzy arithmetic, the Inf and Sup values of 
 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , ,r r rI J Kf u u u x x x Y Y Y    are considered as the lower bound and 
upper bound of the  -cut of rf . After obtaining all  -cuts ( (0,1]  ) of rf , the 
membership function of rf  can be estimated. Hence, the critical procedure of the 
membership function estimation is to derive the Inf and Sup values of the fuzzy output 
in the feasible intervals ( -cuts intervals) subjected to the interrelationships between 
variables. Based on the analysis above, an optimization model is developed to 
calculate the  -cuts of rf , namely, the Inf and Sup values of rf . 
  The model can be formulated as follows: 
 




  1 2 1 2 1 2min( max) , , , , , , , , , , ,r r rI J Kor f f u u u x x x y y y       (6.3) 
subject to: 
  1 2, , , 0Kg y y y     (6.4) 
  1 2, , , 0Kh y y y     (6.5) 
 1, ,,k k ky y y k K
        (6.6) 
 
 The minimum and maximum values of the objective function are considered as 
the lower and upper bounds of the  -cut for the fuzzy number rf .  
  
6.4 Risk Indices  
 Individual risk and societal risk are well recognized risk indices for risk 
assessment of road tunnels. According to the previous definitions, the risk indices are 
combinations of frequencies and consequences of various scenarios. However, the 
frequency and consequence derived by the proposed model are fuzzy numbers rather 
than crisp numbers. Therefore, new methods to calculate IR and SR are proposed in 
this section.  
 
6.4.1 Individual Risk 
 According to the individual risk defined in eqn. (4.1), kn , kL , kiQ , and i  are 
crisp numbers and jkF  and jkx  are sets of fuzzy numbers. Therefore, an IR should be 
a set of fuzzy numbers based on the fuzzy arithmetic and extension principle since 
that it is a function of fuzzy input parameters jkF  and jkx . The plausibility and belief 




curve could be drawn accordingly. The plausibility and belief curves are considered as 
the upper and lower bound of the IR, respectively. The index will be further discussed 
in Chapter 6.5.1. 
 
6.4.2 Societal Risk 
As introduced earlier, the societal risk (F/N curve) reflects the relationship 
between the frequencies and the number of fatalities of all these possible scenarios on 
a double logarithmic scale.  F N  represents the cumulative frequencies of all the 
scenarios with N or more fatalities, mathematically: 
 






F N F x N

    (6.7) 
 
where iF  is the yearly frequency that scenario i occurs; xi is the number of fatalities 
caused by scenario i ; indicator function  ,ix N  is defined by 
 
   1,  if ,








 However, eqns. (6.7) and (6.8) are inapplicable since the frequency and the 
number of fatalities (consequence) are both considered as fuzzy numbers in this 
approach. In order to visualize the societal risk in an F-N axis to be better understood 
by the decision makers, let  kF N  denote the cumulative frequencies of all the 
accident scenarios occurred at tunnel section k  with N or more fatalities, where a 




scenario with N or more fatalities is defined as the scenario when the core, namely, 
1.0 cut of fuzzy number (the number of fatalities of scenario i) xi lies completely by 
the right of crisp number N. We thus have: 
 






F N F x N

    (6.9) 
 
where iF  is the yearly fuzzy frequency that scenario i occurs; xi is the fuzzy number 
of fatalities caused by scenario i ; indicator function  ,ix N  is defined by 
 





x N    (6.10) 
 
 Then N is a crisp number and F is the weighted summation of corresponding 
fuzzy numbers Fi  [1, ]i n . Accordingly, a fuzzy F/N curve can be expressed in 
two-dimension axis as shown in Figure 6-2. However, this expression is not 
straightforward for tunnel managers or decision makers to use. Eventually, two 
alternative measures are proposed to derive the F/N curve to better represent societal 
risk. The first one is to use cores of fuzzy numbers to represent Fi. The second method 
is to use  cuts of fuzzy numbers Fi to express the fuzzy number series. The risk 
indices will be further discussed in Section 6.5. 























Figure 6-2: A fuzzy F/N curve. 
 
6.5 A Numerical Study  
In order to illustrate the proposed model, a numerical study is carried out to 
assess risks for one road tunnel section of KPE (shown in Figure 6-3). The section is 
an 1.8-long main tunnel section. The data for this study are provided by LTA of 
Singapore.  
 
Figure 6-3: KPE road tunnel in Singapore. 




6.5.1 Input Parameters 
6.5.1.1 Input parameters (constant) 
Table 6-4 shows the input parameters without uncertainty. Peak hour refers to 
the time intervals 7:00 am – 9:30 am and 5:00 pm – 8:00 pm and night period refers to 
the time interval 12:00 am – 6:00 am in Singapore. The vehicle proportions are 
obtained from the 24-hrs manned Operation Control Centre (OCC). Note that vehicles 
carrying hazardous materials are not allowed to pass through the KPE road tunnel. 
These parameters have relatively less uncertainty and are considered as constants 
which are represented by crisp numbers in this study.  
 
Table 6-4: Input parameters for KPE road tunnel (constant). 
Notation Value Notation Value 
1u  0.23 14u  2m 
2u  0.52 15u  20m 
3u  0.25 16u  20m 
4u  0.644 17u  30 
5u  0.021 18u  2 
6u  0.164 19u  1.2 
7u  0 20u  1 
8u  0.171 21u  1 
9u  100m 22u  0.98 
10u  0.3 23u  0.02 




11u  0.7 24u  1.2 m/s 
12u  20m 25u  4.5 m/s 
13u  3.5m 26u  1.8 km 
 
6.5.1.2 Input parameters with aleatory uncertainty 
The distributions of input parameters with aleatory uncertainty are summarized as 
Table 6-5 and Table 6-6. Figure 6-4 depicts the probability distributions of traffic 
volumes and the probabilities of tunnel safety provisions failure. This study assumes 
that there is no interdependency among those parameters, which are reasonable in 
reality. Note that we assume the fire fighting system is always available to work.  
 
Table 6-5: Traffic volumes of KPE road tunnel and their distributions. 




Traffic Volume in Peak Hour 1x  Poisson 1412 1685 
Traffic Volume in Normal 
Period 
2x  Poisson 707 852 
Traffic Volume of Night 
Period 
3x  Poisson 195 201 
 
Table 6-6: Tunnel safety provisions failure probability distributions. 








Prob. of Tunnel Ventilation 
System Failure   
4x  Lognormal -8 1 
Prob. of Fire Detection System 
Failure   
5x  Lognormal -7.5 1 
Prob. of Tunnel Communication 
System Failure   
6x  Lognormal -8 0.5 
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Figure 6-4: Probability distributions of input parameters with objective uncertainty 




6.5.1.3 Input parameters with epistemic uncertainty  
Table 6-7 shows the input parameters with epistemic uncertainty and their 
membership functions. The membership functions are obtained in a simple way as 
follows. We requested 9 LTA tunnel risk evaluators to indicate two ranges for a 
parameter with epistemic uncertainty (the possible range  ,L U  and most probable 
range  ,L U ) according to their expert judgment. Then 9 triangular or trapezoidal 
membership functions could be derived for the parameter. Accordingly, crisp 
weighting approach proposed by Bardossy et al. (1993) has been applied to combine 
the fuzzy numbers representing expert opinions5. 
 
Table 6-7: Input parameters with epistemic uncertainty for KPE road tunnel. 
Input Parameters  Notation Membership Function 
Frequency of Fire in Tunnel 1y  Triangular (0.05, 0.21, 0.5) 
Reaction Time of the Inexperienced Driver 2y  Triangular (1.8, 2.5, 3) 
Reaction Time of the Experienced Driver 3y  Triangular (1, 1.5, 2) 
Delay Time when Fire Communication 
System Failing to work   
4y  Trapezoidal (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) 
Delay Time if Tunnel Communication 
System Working Normally 
5y  Trapezoidal (0.5, 0.9, 1.1, 
1.5) 
Delay Time when Fire Detection System 
Failing to Work 
6y  Triangular (2, 3, 4) 
                                                 
5 There are three interpretations in literature for member functions (Beer, 2009; Möller and Beer, 2008; 
Dubois and Prade, 1997): degree of similarity (similarity with weight), degree of preference, and 
degree of possibility. In this study, we adopted the first interpretation.  




Delay Time when Fire Detection System 
Working Normally 
7y  Triangular (1, 1.5, 2) 
 
As can be seen from these membership functions, there are overlaps between 
reaction time, delay time, and air velocities with respect to different working 
conditions of various tunnel safety provisions. This is because the imprecise 
information due to lack of information. The interrelations among the fuzzy numbers 
are formulated as eqns. (6.12)-(6.14). These interrelations are considered as 
constraints when calculating the upper and lower bounds of  -cuts for fuzzy numbers 
(See Chapter 6.3.2).  
 
 2 3y y  (6.11) 
 4 5y y  (6.12) 
 6 7y y  (6.13) 
 
6.5.2 Uncertainty Propagation  
The estimation approach described in Section 4 has been applied for the 
uncertainty propagation in the risk assessment of KPE road tunnels. With respect to 
the input parameters with aleatory uncertainty  1 2 9, , ,x x x , based on an empirical 
trial-and-error test, the sampling realization size is determined to be 1000.
 
 




6.5.2.1 Individual risk  
Figure 6-5 depicts a set of fuzzy individual risks with respect to various 
realizations. For each realization, the individual risk is a fuzzy number. The proposed 
QRA model utilizes the evidence theory to integrate these fuzzy individual risks for 
all the realizations which is shown in Figure 6-6. The separation between plausibility 
and belief measure is caused by the fuzzy input parameters with epistemic uncertainty. 
In reality, if the sufficient data with respect to the fuzzy parameters are available, the 
individual risk should be represented by a single probability cumulative distribution 
function, namely, the belief measure and plausibility measure should converge to the 
probability curve. However, due to limited information of those parameters, it is not 
possible to obtain the probability distribution of the individual risk. The plausibility 
measure gathers the imprecise evidence that asserts the judgment and it is the minimal 
amount of probability that supports the judgment. On the contrary, the belief function 
provides the maximal amount of probability that supports the judgment. Hence, the 
actual probability curve of individual risk should lie in between the plausibility 
measure curve and belief measure curve. Accordingly, the upper bound and lower 
bound of percentile-based individual risk can be shown in Figure 6-6. For example, 
the 80% percentile individual risk is between 81.6236 10  and 86.1787 10 . Hence, 
different from individual risk generated by previous QRA models, not a crisp 
individual risk value but the lower and upper bounds of all the percentile-based 
individual risk can be derived from the proposed model. The percentile-based 
individual risk is thus more useful than a crisp most probable individual risk value for 
decision makers.  
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Figure 6-5: Fuzzy individual risk for various realizations. 
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Figure 6-6: Plausibility and belief measures of individual risk. 
 
6.5.2.1 Societal risk  
Societal risk refers to the relationship between frequency and number of 
fatalities of various scenarios. According to eqns. (10) and (11), the core value (1.0 




cut) based F/N curve and 0.90 cut based F/N curve are depicted in Figure 6-7 and 
Figure 6-8. Similarly, fuzzy F/N curves based on other cuts can also be plotted.  
As can be seen in Figure 6-8, the F/N curve based on core values have similar 
trend with F/N curve derived from the previous QRAFT model with crisp input 
parameters. However, the former has more high-consequence-events (more than 10 
fatalities) circled by Ellipse A in Figure 6-7. This is because the Monte Carlo 
sampling procedure generates some high-consequence scenarios with extremely low 
frequencies (less than 10-10 time per year). It seems that the F/N curve generated by 
QRAFT model is consistently lower than the F/N curve based on core values for those 
scenarios with less than 10 fatalities from the figure. Consequently, we may draw the 
conclusion that the previous evaluation is underestimated. As for the comparison 
between 0.9 cut based F/N curve and F/N generated by QRAM-I, the latter is 
generally in between the upper bound and lower bound of the former for those 
scenarios with less than 10 fatalities. The  -cut based F/N provides lower and upper 
bounds of the actual F/N curve with different levels of confidence. It thus provides 
more information to decision makers to support them to make decisions.  
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Figure 6-7: F/N curve based on core values (1.0 cut). 
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Figure 6-8: F/N curve based on 0.9 cut. 
 




If the subjective uncertainty is neglected, that is, we use the core values to 
represent the fuzzy numbers; the percentile-based F/N curves can be derived. Figure 
6-9 depicts the F/N curve with crisp inputs (crisp F/N curve in short), the 95% and 5% 
percentile-based F/N curves with objective uncertainty only (percentile based F/N 
curves in short), and lower and upper bound by taking into consideration two kinds of 
uncertainty (lower and upper cut in short). As can be seen from the Figure, the 
percentile-based F/N curves are in between the lower and upper cut and the crisp F/N 
curve are further in between the percentile-based F/N curves. The  -cut based F/N 
provides lower and upper bounds of the actual F/N curve with different levels of 
confidence. It thus provides more information to decision makers. 
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Figure 6-9: F/N curve based on 0.9 cut and percentile based F/N curve 
 
6.6 Conclusions   
In a QRA model for fire in road tunnels, a number of input parameters possess 
epistemic or aleatory uncertainty. It would be inappropriate to neglect the influence of 




parameter uncertainty, which may result in unreliable evaluation. This chapter 
presents a study on the representation and propagation of parameter uncertainty in a 
QRA model including event tree analysis as well as consequence estimation models. 
Aleatory uncertainty is formulated by probability distribution functions and 
parameters with epistemic uncertainty are represented by fuzzy numbers. It should be 
pointed out that the dependencies and relationships among variables are addressed by 
using Monte Carlo technique and extension principle of fuzzy set theory. A numerical 
study utilizing Singapore KPE tunnel data is carried out to compare the risk indices 
generated by the present study and the previous QRA model. Eventually, percentile-
based individual risk and  -cut based F/N curve are considered as better indices for 
QRA models of road tunnels.  
The QRAM-I focuses on providing overall risk indices to decision-makers and 
diagnosing the most risky tunnel sections. Indeed, the tunnel managers would prefer a 
simplistic number (individual risk) or a straightforward figure (societal risk) to get an 
idea of the risk level of a road tunnel. However, the tunnel operators may want to look 
into a particular tunnel section (they concerned) to obtain more information about the 
risks (e.g. lower and upper bounds, percentile based values, etc.) by taking into 
account the parameter uncertainty (QRAM-II). In fact, through the discussions with 
LTA engineers, they are more concerned of the uncertainty of several particular input 
parameters. In sum, QRAM-I provides straightforward risk indices for tunnel 
managers and QRAM-II depicts more information about the risks for tunnel operators 
with concerns of parameter uncertainty. 
 
 




CHAPTER 7 OPTIMAL SELECTION OF TUNNEL SAFETY PROVISIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In order to control the loss caused by a certain accident, tunnel safety provisions 
are required to be installed in urban road tunnels. These provisions include tunnel 
detection system, tunnel verification system, tunnel ventilation system, fire fighting 
system, etc. Every system has various types with different functional parameters. For 
example, there are two types of tunnel ventilation systems – transverse ventilation and 
longitudinal ventilation. The former is to protect the tunnel users by keeping the 
smoke stratified in a hot layer underneath the ceiling of the tunnel and extracting it at 
the ceiling, while the latter is to prevent backlayering (Beard, 2009; Beard and Carvel, 
2005). In practice, the selection of tunnel safety provisions is on the basis of expert 
judgment by taking the risk assessment results into account. In reality, the tunnel 
safety provisions are designed at the planning stage. Once the tunnel is open to traffic, 
these parameters are considered to be un-adjustable - it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to adjust these parameters to reduce the risks. Therefore, it is of great 
importance to assess the risks when selecting tunnel safety provisions at the planning 
stage by assuming possible traffic conditions.  
 
7.2 Life Cycle Cost Analysis for Tunnel Safety Provisions 
It is now a common practice to apply engineering economics principles in the 
evaluation of transportation projects, such as highways, bridges, pavements, etc (Fwa 
and Sinha, 1991). Life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) is considered as an effective 




assessment tool for analyzing the performance of complex systems (Mitropoulou, et 
al., 2011). It was introduced in the fields of infrastructures in early 1980s as an 
appraisal tool for the total cost of ownership over the lifespan of an asset (Arditi and 
Messiha, 1996; Asiedu and Gu, 1998).  
The total costs with respect to tunnel safety provisions include purchase cost, 
maintenance cost, and operating cost. The purchase cost refers to the price at which 
one tunnel safety provision is actually purchased and implemented. The maintenance 
cost is the money used to upkeep the tunnel safety provision. The operating cost 
includes the electrical cost of the tunnel safety provision and the salaries of operators 
for the provision. The salvage cost is usually assumed to be zero in the analysis of 
tunnel safety provisions. The different types of tunnel safety provisions with distinct 
cost compositions and life spans could be evaluated in the LCCA framework.  
Henceforth, the following notations apply.  
i
pV : the purchase cost of the tunnel ventilation system with type i;  
i
mV : the maintenance cost of the tunnel ventilation system with type i; 
i
oV : the operating cost (the electrical cost and salaries of operators) of the tunnel 
ventilation system with type i; 
j
pD : the purchase cost of the fire detection system with type j; 
j
mD : the maintenance cost of the fire detection system with type j; 
j
oD : the operating cost (the electrical cost and salaries of operators) of the fire 
detection system with type j; 
k
pF : the purchase cost of the fire verification system with type k; 
k
mF : the maintenance cost of the fire verification system with type k; 





oF : the operating cost (the electrical cost and salaries of operators) of the fire 
verification system with type k; 
iV : the annual worth of the tunnel ventilation system with type i; 
jD : the annual worth of the fire detection system with type j; 
kF : the annual worth of the fire verification system with type k;  
, , and i j kv d fn n n : the study period for tunnel ventilation system with type i, fire 
detection system with type j, and fire verification system with type k, 
respectively; 
The purchase costs and maintenance costs of various types of tunnel safety 
provisions are obtainable from the conceptual design of the tunnel project. The 
operating costs could be estimated by the experienced tunnel operators. By using 
LCCA, we can estimate the annual worth for each combination of candidate tunnel 
safety provisions.   
 
7.3 QRA II Model Based Optimal Selection of Tunnel Safety Provisions  
7.3.1 Model Formulation  
As mentioned earlier, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to change or 
upgrade the tunnel safety provisions to reduce the risks as soon as a tunnel is open to 
traffic. Consequently, on the one hand, the tunnel risks in the life span of the tunnel 
should be managed to be within the safety targets; on the other hand, the decisions 
makers (e.g. LTA of Singapore) may want to minimize the total costs. In this chapter, 
a QRAM-II based optimal selection approach is proposed to support decision makers.  




Sherali et al. (2008) proposed a risk reduction optimization (RRO) model to 
optimally allocate the available resources on the basis of a QRA model for gasline 
rupture situation related to an offshore oil and gas production platform. Their RRO 
model is to minimize risks (in terms of expected loss), subject to the budget and 
resources constraints. However, the formulation cannot be applied to the current study. 
Since the safety targets are compulsory by regulations to be fulfilled in road tunnel 
risk assessment, we should put the risks as the constraints rather than the object to be 
minimized.  
Let AW denote the annual worth of the total costs of various types of tunnel 
safety provisions. We further define binary variables ix , jy , and kz  as follows.  
 
 
1, if the tunnel ventilation system with type  is selected;
0, otherwise                                                                    
i ix    (7.1) 
 
1, if the fire detection system with type  is selected;
0, otherwise                                                             
j jy    (7.2) 
 
1, if the fire verification system with type  is selected;
0, otherwise                                                                   
k kz    (7.3) 
 






i i j j k k
i j k
AW x V y D z F
  
      (7.4) 









  (7.5) 





















  (7.7) 
   criterion, ,SR x y z SR     (7.8) 
   criterion, ,IR x y z IR     (7.9) 
   criterion, ,EV x y z EV     (7.10) 
 , ,  and, 0,1.i j kx y z   (7.11) 
 
In this formulation, the objective function (7.4) seeks to minimize the total costs; 
constraints (7.5) to (7.7) implies that tunnel ventilation systems, fire detection systems, 
and fire verification systems are compulsory components, i.e. at least one type should 
be chosen, for urban road tunnels in Singapore according to the Project Safety Review 
Manual for roads in Singapore; constraint (7.8) indicates that the   cut based societal 
risk should not beyond a predetermined safety target ( criterionSR );  constraints (7.9) and 
(7.10) represent that the   percentile based individual risk and expected value of 
fatalities should be less than or equal to the corresponding predetermined safety 
targets ( criterionIR  and criterionEV ), respectively.  
 
7.3.2 Algorithm  
The optimization model formulated in Section 7.3.1 is a typical integer non-
linear programming model. Thanks to the Constraints (7.5) to (7.7), there would be 
only limited number of feasible combinations of tunnel safety provisions. 
Theoretically, the numbers of solutions satisfying Constraint (7.5), Constraint (7.6), 




and Constraint (7.7) are 2 1I  , 2 1J  , and 2 1K  , respectively. If the numbers of 
candidate tunnel safety provisions raise up, the computational complexity of the 
optimization model would be dramatically increased. In practice, the experts from 
land transport authorities may only provide a few candidate tunnel safety provisions 
(usually 3, 4, and 4I J K   ). If the I is equal to 3, J and K are both equal to 4, the 
number of solutions satisfying Constraints (7.5) to (7.7) is 1575. Under such 
circumstance, it would be very time-consuming (although it is possible) to enumerate 
all solutions satisfying Constraints (7.5) to (7.7) and check whether or not they fulfil 
the safety targets (Constraints (7.8) to (7.10)). 
Based on the QRAM-II, addition of a new tunnel safety provisions will at least 
not increase (most probably reduce) the tunnel risks, i.e. any additional investments 
on tunnel safety provisions will not increase the tunnel risks. For example, assume we 
have a solution (Solution 1), represented by  
 
  1,0,0 , 3x I   (7.12) 
  0,1,1,0 , 4y J   (7.13) 
  0,0,0,1 , 4z K   (7.14) 
 
The solution suggests that the type 1 of ventilation system, types 2 and 3 of fire 
detection system, and type 4 of fire verification system are implemented in the road 
tunnel. Evidently, if the solution satisfies Constraints (7.8) to (7.10), additions of any 
other tunnel safety provisions (e.g.      1,1,0 , 0,1,1,0 , 0,0,0,1x y z     ) will 
definitely be within the safety targets. On the contrary, if the solution does not satisfy 
the Constraints (7.8) to (7.10), any combinations with deductions of any tunnel safety 




provisions (e.g.      1,0,0 , 0,0,1,0 , 0,0,0,1x y z     ) will also be unacceptable 
according to the safety target. Therefore, two domination rules are illustrated as 
follows.  
 
Rule 1: if a combination of candidate tunnel safety provisions does not satisfy 
Constraints (7.8) to (7.10), all the other combinations with deductions of 
tunnel safety provisions will also not be acceptable according to the safety 
targets. 
Rule 2: if a combination of candidate tunnel safety provisions fulfils Constraints 
(7.8) to (7.10), all the other combinations with higher AW value (objective 
function eqn. (7.4)) are not the optimal solution. 
 
By taking advantage of the special structure of the problem, we design a Bi-
Section Search and Bound Algorithm (BSSBA) to solve the problem. The BSSBA is 
presented as follows.  
Step 0: calculate the AW values (the objective function (7.4)) for all the possible 
combinations satisfying Constraints (7.5) to (7.7); 
Step 1: rank the combinations in terms of AW values: (0) (1) ( 1), , , NAW AW AW  , 
where N is the number of available combinations; 
Step 2: check whether or not the combination with median AW value satisfies 
the Constraints (7.8) to (7.10): if yes, remove all the combinations with 
higher AW values (due to domination rule No. 2); otherwise, remove the 
combination itself and all the combinations with deductions of tunnel safety 
provisions (due to domination rule No. 1). 




Step 3: re-rank the remainder combinations in terms of AW values and go to 
Step 2.  
Step 4: stop when optimal solution is found.  
 
7.4 A Numerical Study 
In this section, we use a numerical study to illustrate the model and algorithm 
proposed in Section 7.3. We assume that there are two types of tunnel ventilation 
systems: longitudinal ventilation system and transverse ventilation system; three types 
of fire detection system: line-type heat-sensing cable, smoke detectors, the automatic 
incident detectors; and two types of fire verification system: Closed-Circuit 
Television (CCTV) and emergency telephones. The purchase costs, maintenance costs, 
and operating costs are presented in Table 7-1. Note that the cost summary is provided 
by the tunnel operators from Land Transport Authority of Singapore. The life spans of 
the safety provisions are assumed to be 30 years. The Minimum Attractive Rate of 
Return (MARR) is assumed to be 8%. We use the 0.9 cut based societal risk and 0.9 
percentile based individual risk and expected number of fatalities as the risk indices. 







, 810 , and 0.5, respectively.  
 




Table 7-1: The purchase costs, maintenance costs, and operating costs for various types of tunnel safety provisions  
Tunnel safety provisions Types Purchase costs 
(million SD) 
Maintenance costs 
(million SD per year) 
Operating costs 
(million SD per year) 
Longitudinal  50 5 0.8  
Tunnel ventilation system  Transverse  80 8 1.8 
Heat  4 0.4 0.1 
Smoke  8 0.8 0.1 
 
Fire detection system 
AID 4 0.4 0.1 
CCTV 25 2.5 0.4  
Fire verification system Emergency telephone  20 2 0.1 




According to life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA), the annual worth for various types 
of tunnel safety provisions can be estimated by  
 
  / , 8%, 30i i i ip m oV V A P V V     (7.15) 
  / , 8%, 30i i i ip m oD D A P D D     (7.16) 
  / , 8%, 30i i i ip m oF F A P F F     (7.17) 
 
Table 7-2 illustrates the estimation results for annual worth of tunnel safety 
provisions.  
 
Table 7-2: The annual worth of the candidate tunnel safety provisions  
Tunnel safety provisions  Types  Annual Worth (Million SD) 
Longitudinal  10.24 Tunnel ventilation 
system  Transverse 16.904 
Heat  0.8552 
Smoke  1.6104 
 
Fire detection system 
AID 0.8552 
CCTV 5.12  
Fire verification system Emergency telephone  3.876 
 
The problem can be efficiently solved by the proposed BSSBA algorithm in 9 
iterations (as detailed in Table 7-3).  




Table 7-3: Iterations for solving the problem 









EV value  
Iteration 1 (0,1)x  , (1,1,0)y  , (1,0)z   32 24.4896 Safe Safe Safe 
Iteration 2 (1,0)x  , (1,0,0)y  , (1,1)z   16 20.0912 Safe Safe Safe 
Iteration 3 (1,0)x  , (0, 2,3)y  , (0,1)z   14 16.5816 Risky Safe Safe 
Iteration 4 (1,0)x  , (1,1,0)y  , (1,0)z   7 16.9704 Safe Safe Safe 
Iteration 5 (1,0)x  , (1,0,1)y  , (0,1)z   6 15.8264 Risky Safe Safe 
Iteration 6 (1,0)x  , (0,1,0)y  , (0,1)z   5 15.7264 Risky Safe Safe 
Iteration 7* (1,0)x  , (1,0,0)y  , (1,0)z   3 16.2152 Safe Safe Safe 
Iteration 8 (1,0)x  , (0,0,1)y  , (0,1)z   2 14.9712 Risky Safe Safe 
Iteration 9 (1,0)x  , (1,0,0)y  , (0,1)z   1 14.9712 Risky Safe Safe 
* indicates the optimal solution. 




As can be seen in Table 7-3, the optimal combination of tunnel safety provisions 
is 16.2152 million Singapore dollars. The longitudinal ventilation system, heat 
detector based fire detection system, and CCTV based fire verification system are 
chosen. The societal risk, individual risk, and expected number of fatalities of the 
combination are presented in Figure 7-1 to Figure 7-3.  
 



















Figure 7-1: Societal risk of the optimal combination 
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Figure 7-3: Expected number of fatalities per year of the optimal combination  
 
 




7.5 Conclusions and Discussions 
In this chapter, an optimization model is developed to optimally select the tunnel 
safety provisions on the basis of QRAM-II described in Chapter 6. Tunnel safety 
provisions are the assets of urban road tunnels which are installed and implemented to 
reduce the tunnel risks, which are basically selected by expert judgment in practice. In 
this study, an optimization model is proposed to obtain the optimal solution for the 
selection of tunnel safety provisions. The objective function is to minimize the life 
cycle costs of tunnel safety provisions, which subjects to the requirements for tunnel 
safety provisions and the safety targets. Finally, by taking advantage of the special 
structure of the optimization model, a Bi-Section Search and Bound Algorithm 
(BSSBA) is designed to efficiently solve the problem.  




CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Overview and Contributions of the Work 
This work was performed with regard to two important components in the QRA 
framework: risk assessment and risk control/management. The risk 
control/management strategies are suggested based on the proposed risk assessment 
models (QRAM-I and QRAM-II).  
 
8.1.1 Risk Assessment Models  
In view of the limitations of the existing QRA models for road tunnels, QRAM-I 
was developed to evaluate the risks in non-homogeneous urban road tunnels. A new 
frequency estimation model is proposed and applied in QRAM-I, and a fire simulation 
model and fractional effective dose methodology are initially applied in the QRA 
modelling framework. In addition, IR for urban road tunnels is proposed, to better 
reflect the risks to individual tunnel users with distinct travel profiles. The model has 
been computerized into software, to help tunnel operators evaluate tunnel risks. The 
software has been applied by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore to assess the 
risks of urban road tunnels in the country.  
During discussions with tunnel operators at the Land Transport Authority of 
Singapore, we found that a number of model parameters include uncertainties from 
two distinct origins: inherent variability and a lack of information. Accordingly, 
QRAM-II was developed to address the issue of parameter uncertainty. A hybrid 
Monte Carlo simulation-based approach was designed to propagate the parameter 




uncertainty in the framework of the QRA model, by taking into account the 
dependencies among these uncertain parameters. Finally, percentile-based individual 
risk and  -cut based societal risk were proposed as the most appropriate indices for 
tunnel operators with distinct risk attitudes. 
 
8.1.2 Risk Control/Management Strategies 
If tunnels do not pass a predetermined safety target, risk control/management 
strategies should be implemented. In reality, risk control/management is another 
component of QRA. However, in most existing studies, researchers have focused only 
on the quantitative risk assessment itself and little work has been done on risk 
control/management strategies. Accordingly, in this study, strategies are suggested 
based on QRAM-I and QRAM-II.  
Once a tunnel is open to traffic, the only adjustable parameters by which tunnel 
operators can control/manage the risks are traffic volumes and the proportion of 
HGVs. A QRAM-I based risk impact analysis methodology is proposed. An excess 
risk index is defined to quantify the severities of unacceptable scenarios, which place 
road tunnel operations above a predetermined safety target. A contour chart, based on 
the excess risk index, could be used to help tunnel operators implement suitable risk 
control/management solutions. 
In the planning stage, a critical step that influences tunnel risk is the choice of 
tunnel safety provisions. These are basically selected by expert judgement in practice. 
On the basis of QRAM-II, an optimization model is proposed to obtain the optimal 
solution for the selection of tunnel safety provisions. The objective function is defined 
to minimize the life cycle costs of tunnel safety provisions, subject to the 




requirements for the tunnel safety provisions and the safety targets. Finally, by taking 
advantage of the special structure of the optimization model, a BSSBA is designed to 
efficiently solve the problem. 
 
8.2 Limitations of the thesis  
The limitations of this thesis are summarized as follows. First, tunnel geometric 
parameters are not taken into consideration in the crash frequency estimation model. 
In reality, tunnel geometric parameters, including curvature, gradient, lane width, etc. 
are also important contributing factors to the vehicle crash. TTC alone is not enough 
to predict collisions. Second, the lane changing and weaving are not taken into 
account in this study. In the Singapore’s road tunnels, the HGVs are required to keep 
in lane and cars are allowed to change lanes. Lane changing and weaving could also 
result in crashes. Thus the crash frequency estimated by the proposed model in 
Chapter 3 is just an approximation for the actual crash count. Third, the risk 
assessment by QRAM-I does not deal with entire problem of risk prediction. The risk 
level in the merging area among slip road and main tunnel bore (tunnel intersection 
area) should be specially addressed. This is because the connection area between two 
tunnel sections would be with higher risks since the traffic conditions vary. The 
overall risk indices calculated by weighted summation principle and pessimistic 
principle may only provide partial information to tunnel risk evaluators.  
 
8.3 Recommendations for Future studies  
In future research, it would be of high value to address the following 
recommended research topics, based on the work accomplished in this study: 




(1) The tunnel geometric parameters should be taken into account in the crash 
frequency estimation models. In addition, the crash frequency estimation 
model proposed in Chapter 3 may be applied to estimate crash frequencies 
on highways. However, the distribution types and causation factors should 
be calibrated using actual data collected on the target highway. Further, the 
lane changing and weaving behavior for vehicles in road tunnels would be 
a very interesting research topic.  
(2) The connection area among two tunnel sections should be paid more 
attention to. New risk integration principles (and new risk indices) 
proposed in QRAM-I should be proposed to provide more information for 
tunnel risk evaluators.  
(3) The approach used to build QRAM-I (as detailed in Figure 4-8) could be 
generalized to other critical transportation infrastructures, such as shipping 
channels. In fact, the author of this research has already carried out some 
preliminary studies, applying the same modeling principle (Qu et al., 2011; 
Qu and Meng, 2011). The consequence model validation for QRAM-I will 
also be an interesting topic for future study.  
(4) Dependencies among random numbers or fuzzy numbers could be taken 
into account in the hybrid Monte Carlo simulation-based approach. 
However, the simulation approach cannot address a dependency between a 
random number and a fuzzy number. Accordingly, we assume there are no 
such dependencies in our problem (which is realistic in practice). Further 
studies could be conducted to design a new simulation procedure to 
address this kind of dependency. 




(5) The model uncertainty may also result in variation in the risk assessment 
procedure. Therefore, future studies could also be focused on the model 
uncertainty analysis in the QRA framework.  
 




APPENDIX A: Fault Trees for Tunnel Safety Provisions  
(See Section 4.3.1) 
A.1. Fault Tree for Fire detection Systems  
 
Figure A-1: Fault tree for fire detection systems 
 




A.2. Fault Tree for Tunnel Ventilation Systems  
 
Figure A-2: Fault tree for tunnel ventilation systems 
 









&DUMP RENDER_FILE='tunnel-case.ge1', DT_RESTART=300.0/ 
&MISC CO_PRODUCTION=.TRUE./ 
&MESH ID='KPE', FYI='KPE', IJK=7,50,4, XB=0.0,15.0,0.0,100.0,0.0,8.0/ 
&SPEC ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', MASS_FRACTION_0=0.03/ 
&SPEC ID='CARBON MONOXIDE'/ 
&SPEC ID='OXYGEN', MASS_FRACTION_0=0.21/ 
&PART ID='Fuel', 
      FYI='Ethanol', 
      FUEL=.TRUE., 
      AGE=60.0, 
      DENSITY=789.0, 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=2.44, 
      MELTING_TEMPERATURE=-114.3, 
      VAPORIZATION_TEMPERATURE=78.4, 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION=841.0, 
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=2.98E4/ 
&REAC ID='REAC', 
      C=3.0, 
      H=8.0, 
      O=2.0, 
      N=1.0/ 
&PROP ID='Default', QUANTITY='LINK TEMPERATURE', 
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=74.0/ 
&PROP ID='Cleary Ionization I1', 
      QUANTITY='CHAMBER OBSCURATION', 
      ALPHA_E=2.5, 
      BETA_E=-0.7, 
      ALPHA_C=0.8, 
      BETA_C=-0.9/ 
&DEVC ID='HD', PROP_ID='Default', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0, 
INITIAL_STATE=.TRUE./ 
&DEVC ID='SD', PROP_ID='Cleary Ionization I1', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&MATL ID='XLP', 
      FYI='NISTIR 1013-1 - NIST NRC Validation', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', 
      CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', 
      DENSITY=1374.0, 
      EMISSIVITY=0.95/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=23.0, F=1.39/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=50.0, F=1.48/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=75.0, F=1.53/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=100.0, F=1.56/ 




&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=125.0, F=1.58/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP', T=150.0, F=1.61/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=23.0, F=0.235/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=50.0, F=0.232/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=75.0, F=0.223/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=100.0, F=0.21/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=125.0, F=0.19/ 
&RAMP ID='XLP_CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP', T=150.0, F=0.192/ 
&SURF ID='Blow', 
      VEL=-4.0, 
      POROUS=.TRUE./ 
&SURF ID='Pine', 
      RGB=146,202,166, 
      HRRPUA=5.0E4, 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='XLP', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.5, 
      PART_ID='Fuel'/ 
&VENT SURF_ID='Blow', XB=0.0,15.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,8.0/ Vent 
&VENT SURF_ID='Pine', XB=5.0,9.0,5.0,9.0,0.0,0.0/ Vent 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=0.0,15.0,100.0,100.0,0.0,8.0/ Vent 
&BNDF QUANTITY='MASS FLUX', SPEC_ID='carbon dioxide'/ 
&BNDF QUANTITY='MASS FLUX', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide'/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBZ=0.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='carbon dioxide', PBZ=2.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide', PBZ=2.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='oxygen', PBZ=2.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBZ=2.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='carbon dioxide', PBZ=4.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='carbon monoxide', PBZ=4.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='oxygen', PBZ=4.0/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBZ=4.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON MONOXIDE] Density_MIN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON MONOXIDE', STATISTICS='MIN', 
XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON MONOXIDE] Density_MAX', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON MONOXIDE', 
STATISTICS='MAX', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON MONOXIDE] Density_MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON MONOXIDE', 
STATISTICS='MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON MONOXIDE] Density_VOLUME MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON MONOXIDE', 
STATISTICS='VOLUME MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='Temperature_MIN', QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', 
STATISTICS='MIN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='Temperature_MAX', QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', 
STATISTICS='MAX', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 




&DEVC ID='Temperature_MEAN', QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', 
STATISTICS='MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='Temperature_VOLUME MEAN', QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', 
STATISTICS='VOLUME MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON DIOXIDE] Density_MIN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', STATISTICS='MIN', 
XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON DIOXIDE] Density_MAX', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', STATISTICS='MAX', 
XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON DIOXIDE] Density_MASS MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', STATISTICS='MASS 
MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON DIOXIDE] Density_MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', STATISTICS='MEAN', 
XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: CARBON DIOXIDE] Density_VOLUME MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='CARBON DIOXIDE', 
STATISTICS='VOLUME MEAN', XB=0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_TIME INTEGRAL', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='TIME INTEGRAL', 
XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_MIN', QUANTITY='DENSITY', 
SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='MIN', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_MAX', QUANTITY='DENSITY', 
SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='MAX', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_MASS MEAN', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='MASS MEAN', 
XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_MEAN', QUANTITY='DENSITY', 
SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='MEAN', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_VOLUME INTEGRAL', 
QUANTITY='DENSITY', SPEC_ID='oxygen', STATISTICS='VOLUME 
INTEGRAL', XYZ=0.0,0.0,0.0/ 
&DEVC ID='[Extra Species: oxygen] Density_VOLUME MEAN', 










Appendix C: QRA Software Introduction   
(See Section 4.3.3) 
The QRAM-I is computerized in order to facilitate the tunnel engineers from 
LTA of Singapore to evaluate the risks. Currently, the software is applied by the 
Division of System Integration and Assurance of LTA to assess and audit the risks for 
Singapore’s road tunnels.  
C.1 Development Platform 
The object-oriented programming (OOP) has unique features including 
encapsulation, inheritance, polymorphism, pointers, operator overloading. In reality, 
OOP is an appropriate method for modeling complex situations. OOP concepts are 
more flexible and powerful than traditional methods. There are several advantages of 
the object-oriented programming. First, OOP allows users to decompose a problem 
into a number of entities called objects and builds data and functions around these 
entities. Second, OOP treats data as a critical element in the program development and 
does not allow it to flow freely around the entire program. Third, Object-Oriented 
Programs can be assembled from pre-written software components, which can be used 
in different applications. Fourth, new software components in OOP can be written or 
developed from the existing ones without affecting the original components. Last but 
not least, in OOP, the program units mirror the real world entities effectively and 
therefore are particularly reusable. 
The typical object oriented programming languages like C++, C# and Java, are 
designed to provide major advantages in the professional software development and 
engineering application. C# is a simple, modern and object oriented language derived 
from C and C++. C# code looks like C++ and Java codes. C# compiler was designed 




by a team led by Microsoft, to create code for the .NET (dot net) Framework. 
Microsoft .NET Framework is a development platform using the Microsoft Windows 
operating system. With the high-level language platform (Microsoft .NET) it is much 
easier to develop software than in any of the other low level programming languages. 
The C# language was designed to create code on visual studio.NET and it uses the 
libraries defined by the .NET Framework. The C# language provides the features that 
are most important to programmers, such as object oriented programming, strings, 
properties and events, graphics, graphical-user interface components, exception 
handling, multithreading, ASP.NET dynamic web pages, XML, web services, file 
processing, data base processing. We develop the QRA software tool by using.NET 
Framework because it is a good environment that supports the development and 
execution of highly distributed component based applications.  
 
C.2 Database  
 XML file is used to manage the tree structures and MS access is adopted to 
manage all the input data and parameters needed by the proposed QRA model. XML 
files have a hierarchical structure and can conceptually be interpreted as a tree 
structures which is called XML tree. In addition, the parameters attached to each node 
in the tree structures of the proposed QRA model can be saved as the node attribute. 
Therefore, the XML file is well recognized as an efficient and effective tool to deal 
with the tree structures including event trees and fault trees. Figure C-1 shows the MS 
access structure of important tables.  

































































Figure C-1: Database design 
 
C.3 Business Logic 
Three-layer system structure is employed – Graphical User Interface (GUI), 
functional modules, and databases, and their relations are shown in Figure C-2. The 
basic business logic is as follows: first, all the parameters are inputted and stored in 
databases by GUI. Second, the functional module retrieves data from databases to 
perform their function. There are five main functional modules: event tree edit, fault 
tree edit, GIS (Geographic Information System) module, risk calculation module, and 
risk evaluation module. Among the five modules, calculation module is the most 
important one. The consequence parameters from database, event tree parameters 
from event tree XML file, and fault tree parameters from fault tree XML file are 




retrieved in this module. Our QRA model will be performed in C#.net environment by 
using this module. The output of this module is the frequency and number of fatalities 
of each scenario. 
 
 
Figure C-2: Business logic 
 
C.4 Snapshots of the QRA Software Tool 
Figure C-3 shows the main interface of the QRA software tool, and each menu 
corresponds to a functional module. Figure C-4 depicts traffic and vehicle inputting 
interface. Similarly, other event tree parameters and fault tree parameters can also be 
inputted to database by GUI. Figure C-5 shows the deterministic safety analysis (DSA) 
module of the software tool. Once scenarios are selected, consequences and 
frequencies of the related scenarios can be presented in GUI.  





Figure C-3: Main interface of the QRA software tool 
 
 
Figure C-4: Interface for the event tree module 
 





Figure C-5: Interface for the deterministic safety analysis 
 
C.5 Merits  
Object Oriented Design method is adopted in this software due to its flexibility 
and robustness. According to OOD method, database and functional modules can be 
easily maintained and updated. Therefore, our software possesses advantage of strong 
portability. Without any major changes, it can be applied to estimate risks for road 
tunnels in other countries. Meanwhile, the consequence models can be updated 
according to the development of related researches if necessary. In this case, the 
software can be conveniently upgraded by programmer. 
The QRA Software employs XML files to access the tree structures of event 
trees and fault trees, instead of adjacency list or adjacency matrix. Each sequential 
event can be represented by a set of XML tree nodes. Therefore, it is effortless for 
programmer to edit, add, or delete sequential events. Once the tunnel is equipped with 
new tunnel mitigation facilities, trees structure can be rebuilt by making minor 
revisions.
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